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Undocumented Aliens and the Constitution:
Limitations on State Action Denying
Undocumented Children Access to
Public Education
By ROBERT F. KANE* and FELIX VELARDE-MUROZ**
Introduction
Federal officials estimate that there are between six and ten million
undocumented aliens1 in the United States.2 Many of these aliens have
resided here for a number of years and have established strong ties with the
American community. 3 Although it is generally believed that undocumented
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The authors wish to state that the original working draft of this commentary was published
without their knowledge or permission by another law review while the final revised manu-
script was at the Quarterly's printer. The Editorial Board of the Quarterly has decided to
publish this commentary because it differs significantly from the unauthorized draft that
appeared previously.
The authors wish to express their appreciation to Mr. Peter Roos and the Mexican
American Legal Defense and Education Fund for their advice and assistance in the preparation
of this article, and to Felipe V. Flores for having initiated this project. -
I. An undocumented alien or undocumented person is an alien who is in the United
States without proper documentation, either as a result of having entered this country illegally
or, having entered legally, subsequently violating the conditions of entry. See HOUSE COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, 95TH CONG., lST SESS., ILLEGAL ALIENS: ANALYSIS AND BACKGROUND 1
(Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter cited as JUDICIARY REPORT ON ILLEGAL ALIENS]. Undocument-
ed aliens commonly are referred to as illegal aliens, or as "wetbacks" if from Mexico. See
Ortega, The Plight of the Mexican Wetback, 58 A.B.A.J. 231 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Ortega]. Because of the derogatory use of the term "wetback" in reference to persons of
Mexican descent and the stigma of the label "illegal," the authors have avoided these refer-
ences where possible.
2. Getting Their Slice of the Pie, TIME, May 2, 1977, at 26. Estimates are at best only
educated guesses. See JUDICIARY REPORT ON ILLEGAL ALIENS, supra note 1, at 3-4. Statistics
published by the Immigration & Naturalization Service (INS) report the number of undocu-
mented aliens taken into custody, from which the number that remain undiscovered may be
extrapolated. Nearly 700,000 aliens were apprehended in fiscal year 1974. See Comment, The
Undocumented Alien andDe Canas v. Bica: The Supreme Court Capitulates to Public Pressure,
3 CHICANO L. REV. 164 (1976).
3. Leonel J. Castillo, the head of the INS, estimates that there are about 500,000 illegal
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aliens have an adverse impact on American labor, 4 recent studies indicate
that undocumented aliens contribute substantially to the American econo-
my5 and pay their share of taxes. 6 With the continuing deterioration of the
American economy and increasing demands on governmental services,
however, there is growing public pressure to control illegal immigration and
penalize those undocumented aliens residing in this country.7
Various proposals regarding illegal immigration and undocumented
aliens have been and are now before Congress. 8 Notwithstanding the federal
government's potential involvement in the field, state governments have
enacted legislation designed to minimize the adverse impact of undocument-
ed aliens residing in their jurisdictions. 9 For example, the Texas legislature
aliens now residing in the United States who have been here since 1960, and between 2.5 and 5
million who arrived between 1970 and January 1, 1977. Reston, Illegal Aliens Dilemma, S.F.
Chronicle, Aug. 6, 1977, at 36, col. 3.
4. A Department of Labor spokesman testified before a committee of the House of
Representatives that illegally employed aliens:
1. Take jobs which would normally be filled by American workers;
2. Depress the wages and impair the working conditions of American citizens;
3. Compete with unskilled and uneducated American citizens... ;
4. Increase the burden on American taxpayers through added welfare costs...
5. Reduce the effectiveness of employee organizations;
6. Constitute for employers a group highly susceptible for exploitation.
H.R. REP. No. 108, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1973). See also Rodino, The Impact of Immigration
on the American Labor Market, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 245 (1974); JUDICIARY REPORT ON ILLEGAL
ALIENS, supra note 1, at 24.
5. Abrams & Abrams, Immigration Policy-Who Gets in and Why?, THE PUBLIC INTER-
EST, Winter 1975, at 26-27; Cook, An Economic Analysis: How Illegal Aliens Pay as They Go,
NEW WEST, May 23, 1977, at 34; Steinman, Scapegoats of Unemployment, NATION, April 17,
1972, at 497-500; Wood, Illegal Aliens'Economic Role, S.F. Chronicle, Sept. 11, 1977, at 12,
col. 1. In a recent article, one commentator concluded after reviewing the evidence that
"though the problem [of undocumented aliens] generates much anxiety, it appears to be a good
deal less critical than commonly articulated." Nafziger, A Policy FrameworkforRegulating the
Flow of Undocumented Mexican Aliens into the United States, 56 ORE. L. REV. 63, 97 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Nafziger]. But see Salinas & Torres, The Undocumented Mexican Alien: A
Legal, Social and Economic Analysis, 13 Hous. L. REV. 863, 876-81 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Salinas & Torres].
6. See JUDICIARY REPORT ON ILLEGAL ALIENS, supra note 1, at 23; DOMESTIC COUNCIL
COMMITrEE ON ILLEGAL ALIENS, PRELIMINARY REPORT, December 1976, at 151 [hereinafter
cited as DOMESTIC COUNCIL REPORT]. See also Cornelius, Mexican Migration to the United
States: The Views from Rural Sending Communities 29 (June 1976); Deedy, News & Views:
Illegal Aliens, 102 COMMONWEALTH 194 (1975).
7. The Gallup Poll Reports Hard Line on Aliens, S.F. Chronicle, Oct. 31, 1977, at 7, col.
1. See also Bustamante, Structural and Ideological Conditions of the Mexican Undocumented
Immigration to the United States, 19 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 364, 374-75 (1976); Nafziger,
supra note 5, at 64.
8. JUDICIARY REPORT ON ILLEGAL ALIENS, supra note 1, at 1-2; Salinas & Torres, supra
note 5, at 900-910. For a summary of President Carter's proposal, see 123 CONG. REC. H8680
(daily ed. Aug. 4, 1977); 123 CONG. REC. S13826 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1977).
9. For example, California, Connecticut and Kansas have recently enacted laws prohibit-
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enacted a statute in 1975 that limits free public education to citizens and
legally admitted alien children. 1° Prior to 1975, each child residing in that
state was guaranteed a free public education at his local school. 1 Although a
literal reading of the present statute does not prohibit undocumented chil-
dren 12 from attending public schools, the law was designed to effectively
deny these children that opportunity by requiring them to pay tuition.13 As a
result, undocumented children cannot enroll in the Houston public schools
unless they pay $90.00 monthly tuition.14 Similarly, in the Austin Indepen-
ing employers from knowingly hiring an alien who is not entitled to lawful residence in the
United States. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2805 (West Supp. 1977); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51k
(West Supp. 1978); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4409 (1974). See also Salinas & Torres, supra note 5,
at 895-96.
10. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.031 (Vernon Supp. 1978). See also Shafer, Foreign-Born
Children of Illegal Immigrants: A Growing Problem, INTEGRATEDUCATION, Nov.-Dec. 1976, at
18 [hereinafter cited as Shafer].
11. TEX. EDUC. CODE § 21.031 (Vernon 1972) (amended 1975) provided a free public
education to any child who was a resident of the local school district. This statute was
interpreted to specifically include undocumented children. See Texas Attorney General's
Opinion No. H-586 (opinion letter, April 18, 1975).
12. Undocumented children are children who are aliens in the United States without
proper documentation. See note I supra. Children born in the United States to parents who are
in the country illegally are not undocumented aliens. All persons born in the United States are
citizens regardless of the parents' immigration status. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See also
Acosta v. Gaffney, 413 F. Supp. 827, 830-33 (D.N.J. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 558 F.2d
1153 (3d Cir. 1977).
13. Section 21.013 of the Texas Education Code as amended in 1975 reads:
(a) All children who are citizens of the United States or legally admitted aliens and
who are over the age of five years and under the age of 21 years on the first day of
September of any scholastic year shall be entitled to the benefits of the Available
School Fund for that year.
(b) Every child in this State who is a citizen of the United States or a legally admitted
alien and who is over the age of five years and not over the age of 21 years on the first
day of September of the year in which admission is sought shall be permitted to attend
the public free schools of the district in which he resides or in which his parent,
guardian, or the person having lawful control of him resides at the time he applies for
admission.
(c) The board of trustees of any public free school district of this state shall admit
into the public free schools of the district free of tuition all persons who are either
citizens of the United States or legally admitted aliens and who are over five and not
over 21 years of age at the beginning of the scholastic year if such person or his parent,
guardian or person having lawful control resides within the school district.
TEx. EDUC. CODE § 21.03(a)-21.031(c) (Vernon Supp. 1978).See also Letter of M.L. Brockette,
Texas Commissioner of Education, to the Honorable John A. Traeger, Texas State Senator
(Nov. 28, 1975). Brockette states that under the new law undocumented children "who are
admitted to school are not eligible to receive benefits of such state funds and must be provided
for by local or other resources." The sponsor of the Texas law, Texas State Representative
Ruben M. Torres, in a letter dated March 14, 1975, to the Honorable Tom C. Massey, Texas
State Representative and Chairman of the Committee on Public Education, stated that the main
purpose of the new law is to "eliminate the admission of illegal aliens to public school districts
in Texas."
14. The Daily Texan (student newspaper of the University of Texas), Oct. 28, 1976, at 12,
col. 4. See also Houston Chronicle, Sept. 12, 1976, at 1.
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dent School District, an undocumented child must pay tuition ranging from
$1300 a year for elementary students to $1728 a year for senior high school
students. 15 Since most undocumented children in Texas are from poor
Mexican families, 16 the burden of tuition effectively prevents these children
from attending school. 
17
Supporters of the Texas law argue that undocumented children are
inundating the public schools and thus adversely affecting the education of
other students as well as burdening the Texas taxpayer.I8 This proposition
is, however, highly speculative. It is virtually impossible to ascertain the
exact number of undocumented children involved, or their impact on educa-
tional services.19 More importantly, the parents of undocumented children,
like those of citizen and lawful resident children, pay their fair share for
education through state and federal taxes. 20 The denial of education to
15. The Daily Texan, Oct. 28, 1976, at 12, col. 4.
16. Ortega, supra note 1, at 251. See also HUMAN RESOURCES AGENCY, SAN DIEGO
COUNTY, A STUDY OF THE SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACT OF ILLEGAL ALIENS ON THE COUNTY OF SAN
DIEGO (1977) [hereinafter cited as SAN DIEGO STUDY]. This study was commissioned by the
County of San Diego to determine the socio-economic impact of illegal aliens on the County of
San Diego, the area in the nation most affected by the influx of illegal immigrants. The study
estimated that an undocumented worker earns an average of $4,368 a year, well below that
which is required to support a family. Id. at xi.
17. See The Daily Texan, Oct. 28, 1976, at 12, col. 5.
18. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 21.031 (Vernon Supp. 1978), denying free public
education to undocumented children. In Doe v. Plyler, No. TY-77-261-CA (E.D. Tex., Sept. 12,
1977) (order granting preliminary injunction), the district court preliminarily enjoined the Tyler
Independent School District (Texas) from enforcing their restrictive admissions policy based on
section 21.031, and from attempting to charge undocumented children tuition as a precondition
to enrollment in furtherance of that policy. The court found that the primary purpose of the
Texas statute and the Tyler policy denying free public education to undocumented children is
"to employ public educational funds for providing education to U.S. citizens and legally
admitted aliens, and to prevent the potential drain on such funds should Tyler or Texas in
general, become a haven for illegal aliens." Id., Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 4.
The defendant school district argued: "'There is a limited amount of revenue available within
the State which can be used to achieve the social goal of educating the State's children. The
legislature has determined that those funds are to be used to educate the United States' citizens
and the legally admitted aliens who reside in Texas.'" Id. at 11 (quoting Brief for Defendant at
16). See also S.F. Chronicle, Oct. 26, 1977, at B-6, col. 1; Shafer, supra note 10, at 18-19.
19. Attempts io determine the number of undocumented persons in the United States and
their impact are highly speculative, and figures purporting to show pressure-mounting impact
should be examined with caution. See Comment, The Undocumented Worker: The Controversy
Takes a New Turn, 3 CHICANO L. REv. 164, 164-65 n.3 (1976) [hereinafter cited as The
Undocumented Worker]; Diamond, The Alien Hordes: Problem or Propaganda?, NEW WEST,
Dec. 6, 1976, at 103 [hereinafter cited as Diamond]. A recent report to the Domestic Council
Committee on Illegal Aliens indicates that the illegal alien population from Mexico is over-
whelmingly young, predominantly male and, more often than not, single. DOMESTIC COUNCIL
REPORT, supra note 6, at 132. See also J. SAMORA, Los MOJADOS: THE WETBACK STORY 89-94
(1971) [hereinafter cited as SAMORA]. Nevertheless, in the San Diego study the cost impact of
undocumented children for 1976-1977 was estimated at $100,000. SAN DIEGO STUDY, supra note
16, at xxiii.
20. See text accompanying notes 171-76 infra.
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undocumented children in Texas is of considerable importance not only to
the residents of Texas but also to the rest of the nation. As the economic
situation worsens, other states, which now provide free public education to
undocumented children, 21 will come under increasing pressure to follow the
model set by Texas and deny state benefits to these individuals.
22
This article will explore the plight of the undocumented child and the
constitutional arguments available to challenge such statutes, using the
Texas statute as a focal point. The historical and sociological background
of undocumented aliens, including the problems of illegal immigration from
Mexico, will be described initially. The status of undocumented aliens
under the United States Constitution will then be explored. The commentary
will finally discuss three constitutional limitations on state action that may
secure for undocumented children those rights denied by the Texas statute.
The sources of these limitations are the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and the doctrine of federal preemp-
tion developed under the supremacy clause.
I. The Undocumented Alien in Perspective
The border between Texas and Mexico was established in 1848 with
the signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.' a This 889 mile border is,
however, something of a fiction. It becomes real only when some national
policy prompts either the United States or Mexico to assert the fact of its
existence. More realistically, this border represents a permeable membrane
that joins rather than separates the two nations.'
To understand the problem of the undocumented child in Texas, one
must examine the historical background of illegal immigration from Mex-
ico. Migration patterns indicate that immigrants generally flow from a place
21. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 42900 (West Spec. Pamph. 1976).
22. See The Undocumented Worker, supra note 19, at 164-65. Moreover, in Texas there is
now increasing pressure to deny free public education to lawful resident alien children. See
Houston Chronicle, Dec. 7, 1975, at 26, col. 1; Letter from M. L. Brockette, Texas Commis-
sioner of Education, to the Governor of Texas and Members of the 64th Legislature (July 24,
1975).
23. This issue is currently pending in the federal courts. See Doe v. Plyler, No. TY-77-261-
CA (E.D. Tex., Sept. 12, 1977) (order granting preliminary injunction). This article does not
explore possible state statutory or constitutional arguments that might be made. See, e.g.,
Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976), cert. denied sub nom.
Clowes v. Serrano, 432 U.S. 907 (1977) (declaring California's public school financing system
violative of state constitutional provisions guaranteeing equal protection of the law). See
generally Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L.
REV. 489 (1977).
24. SAMORA, supra note 19, at 16.
25. F. SCHMIDT, SPANISH SURNAMED AMERICANS EMPLOYED IN THE SOUTHWEST 7 (1970).
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of origin where economic opportunities are restricted to destinations where
economic opportunities are comparatively greater. 26 Migration from Mexico
to the United States is thus caused by the relatively poor economic condi-
tions in Mexico.27 Illegal immigration occurs because the restrictive immig-
ration laws of the United States conflict with these economic realities.
United States industry has historically exploited this situation by fostering
an immigration policy that favors Mexicans as laborers rather than settlers.
28
The first restrictions on immigration to the United States were enacted
in 1882 to prevent the importation of "cheap" labor. 29 At that time, the
target was not migration from Mexico; the first immigration restrictions
were aimed at the Chinese. 0 Consequently, the immigration restrictions that
were enacted31 were soon waived for Mexican laborers by the Departmental
Order of 1913.32 This order represented the first successful attempt by
growers and other industrialists to import Mexican labor with government
approval. 33 Thereafter, American employers actively recruited Mexican
labor.
34
Although the Departmental Order was initiated as a wartime measure,
35
southwestern growers and industrialists continued after World War I to
encourage the movement of Mexicans across the border as a source of cheap
labor. 36 The Great Depression brought an abrupt end to this relatively open
26. Frisbie, Illegal Migration from Mexico to the United States: A LongitudinalAnalysis,
9 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 3, 3 (1975). See also JUDICIARY REPORT ON ILLEGAL ALIENS, supra
note 1, at 10-11.
27. United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398, 402-08 (S.D. Cal. 1973), quoted in United
States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 901-02 (1975) (appendix to concurring opinion of Burger, C. J.);
SPECIAL STUDY GROUP ON ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS FROM MEXICO, A PROGRAM FOR EFFECTIVE AND
HUMANE ACTION ON ILLEGAL MEXICAN IMMIGRANTS 7 (1973) [hereinafter cited as CRAMTON
REPORT]. Cramton was chairman of the Special Study Group.
28. SAMORA, supra note 19, at 57.
29. See Cardenas, United States Immigration Policy Toward Mexico: An Historical Per-
spective, 2 CHICANO L. REV. 66, 67 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Cardenas].
30. See SAMORA, supra note 19, at 35.
31. The Immigration Law of 1882, ch. 376, 22 Stat. 214 (repealed 1966), established a head
tax and provided for the exclusion of certain classes of people and other persons likely to
become public charges. In 1885 Congress passed the Alien Contract Labor Law, ch. 164, 23
Stat. 332 (repealed 1952), making it illegal to assist the immigration of foreigners to the United
States in contemplation of work to be done in the United States for the assisting person. In 1917
a literacy test was made a requirement for admission to the United States. Act of Feb. 5, 1917,
ch. 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 874 (repealed 1952).
32. The Departmental Order of 1913 by the Commissioner General of Immigration waived
the head tax, contract labor and literacy requirements for Mexican laborers. See Cardenas,
supra note 29, at 67-68.
33. See Cardenas, supra note 29, at 67.
34. SAMORA, supra note 19, at 39.
35. Cardenas, supra note 29, at 68.
36. SAMORA, supra note 19, at 39.
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border policy. 37 During the depression, Mexican nationals were displaced,
deported and prevented from entering the United States. 38 This reversal in
policy created grave hardships for the Mexican nationals who had grown
economically dependent on the United States.
39
With the advent of war and burgeoning economic activity, the United
States again sought to utilize Mexican labor. In 1942, the Bracero Program
was initiated through a bilateral agreement between the United States and
Mexico; it allowed the temporary migration of Mexican farmworkers to the
United States . 0 The creation and maintenance of this program was the result
of the growers' influence on public policy. 41 During this period, Mexican
migration was governed by the ability of the United States to absorb workers
rather than by a limitation on the supply of Mexican workers.42 The north-
ward movement of undocumented.Mexican nationals was stimulated by this
program and the expectation of work it created. 3 Consequently, while the
Bracero Program provided the means by which the Mexican national could
legally work in the United States, it also fostered illegal immigration.
44
37. Id. at 40-41.
38. Id. at 41-42.
39. See McClean, Tightening the Mexican Border, 64 SURVEY 28 (1930) wherein the author
states:
inhere are certain elements of injustice in the new border policy. For ten years, the
Mexican peon had surely been the Atlas holding upon his broad shoulders the econom-
ic life of the Southwest. He has bent his back over every field, toiled on every mile of
railroad, and poured his sweat into every cubic yard of concrete. We have needed him;
we have felt that we could not get along without him. And when our need was most
acute in the industrial epoch which followed the war, we forgot our own immigration
laws. Now that the acute need has passed away, by a stricter interpretation we are
uprooting these people and sending them home. By actual deportations, or by "putting
the fear of God" into their hearts, we are thrusting them into an economic order with
which they have grown unfamiliar. Most of them have been conscious of doing no
wrong. And when they steal back across the line to reestablish themselves in the social
and economic order to which we have accustomed them, they are thrown in jail as
common felons. The injustice comes not from any particular border policy, but rather
because we have had no consistent policy.
Id. at 55, quoted in SAMORA, supra note 19, at 43.
40. See Cardenas, supra note 29, at 75.
41. SAMORA, supra note 19, at 44.
42. Id.
43. Salinas & Torres, supra note 5, at 871. See also note 44 infra.
44. See Hadley, A Critical Analysis of the Wetback Problem, 21 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
334 (1956) in which the author states:
Apparently, the relation between this Mexican contract labor program and the
spiraling illegal immigration was this: Contract workers returned with exciting tales of
the money that could be earned in the United States. The next year these same
workers wanted to repeat their performance and their neighbors wanted to join. The
result was that there were many more Mexicans who wanted to come to the United
States than there were certifications of need issued by the Secretary of Labor.
Further, managing to be among the workers selected by the Mexican officials for the
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Although the program was terminated in 1964, the importation of Mexicans
as temporary agricultural workers continues under the Immigration and
Nationality Act.a'
Ensuing efforts to control illegal immigration have corresponded to the
United States' ability to absorb and profit from the efficient utilization and
exploitation of undocumented Mexican aliens.46 The transition from a rela-
tively open to a closed border policy occurs in cycles depending on the
demands of the United States economy.4 7 As one commentator has noted:
The "illegal alien" problem is therefore one whose seed has been
planted time and again by the United States when it has been in
need of Mexican labor. When expediency better serves, however,
immigration laws have been administered and changed in response
to a problem perceived as having been created by illegal aliens,
when in fact it is largely of the United States' own making.
8
Even with an ailing economy, the economic and employment opportunities
in the United States surpass those in Mexico.49 This economic disparity,
coupled with historic and cultural factors, continues to exert tremendous
pressure on Mexican nationals to migrate to the United States.
50
The life of those who have immigrated illegally to the United States is
not ideal. Although many undocumented aliens have developed strong ties
with the American community, they nevertheless live in a state of fear.
5 1
Undocumented aliens are subjected to abuse and exploitation in a variety of
ways.52 Employers, landlords and merchants are all able to exploit them,
knowing that the undocumented alien can be turned over to federal officials
for deportation if he challenges their authority. 53 Undocumented Mexican
workers are generally employed in the lowest paying jobs, often at a wage
below the legally required minimum wage.5 4 They come here illegally,
nevertheless, because it is the only alternative to the extreme poverty in
which they live in Mexico.
55
program characteristically required the persuasion of a bribe. Thus, it seemed to many
much simpler to seek American employment on their own.
Id. at 344, quoted in SAMORA, supra note 19, at 44-45.
45. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). See Cardenas, supra note 29, at 79. See
also Comment, The Alien Commuter After Saxbe v. Bustos, 8 U.C.D. L. REV. 33 (1975).
46. SAMORA, supra note 19, at 57.
47. Id. at 49.
48. Cardenas, supra note 29, at 89.
49. CRAMTON REPORT, supra note 27, at 7-8.
50. Id. at 8.
51. Ortega, supra note 1, at 251.
52. CRAMTON REPORT, supra note 27, at 11; JUDICIARY REPORT ON ILLEGAL ALIENS, supra
note 1, at 18.
53. Ortega, supra note 1, at 252; United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 904 (1975)
(appendix to concurring opinion of Burger, C.J.).
54. See SAMORA, supra note 19, at 99.
55. Ortega, supra note 1, at 251. See also SAMORA, supra note 19, at 97.
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After years of neglecting the complex problems of illegal immigration
and the undocumented alien, the federal government has now begun to act.
5 6
President Carter has proposed legislation to reduce illegal immigration and
to legitimize the status of those undocumented persons already residing in
this country. 57 Yet some states such as Texas, acting through their legisla-
tures, are initiating measures to immunize themselves from the impact of the
undocumented alien. Undocumented children are caught in the middle of
this situation. They are the product of historic and economic factors beyond
their control, and education offers one of the few opportunities to break the
cycle of poverty and ignorance in which they live.
58
11. Constitutional Rights of Undocumented Aliens
In Mathews v. Diaz, 59 the United States Supreme Court expressly
recognized that undocumented aliens are protected by the due process clause
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 60 Whether other explicit or im-
plicit constitutional rights of citizens extend to undocumented aliens remains
unclear. 61 Few courts have faced these issues, largely because undocument-
56. Reston, Illegal Aliens Dilemma, S.F. Chronicle, Aug. 6, 1977, at 36, col. 4.
57. See Wall St. J., Sept. 19, 1977, at 1. Now before Congress, President Carter's proposal
includes provisions that make it unlawful to hire undocumented aliens, that adjust the status of
undocumented aliens residing in this country, that increase cooperation between the United
States and the countries that are the source of illegal immigration, and that increase the budget
of border enforcement. See 123 CONG. REc. H8680 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1977); 123 CONG. REc.
S13826 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1977).
58. See S. REP. No. 146, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. I, reprinted in [1965] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1448. See also Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
59. 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
60. Id. at 77.
61. In Mathews, the Court stated: "The Fifth Amendment, as well as the Fourteenth
Amendment, protects every one of these persons from deprivations of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law. . . . Even one whose presence in this country is unlawful. . . is
entitled to that protection." Id. Thus, the Court implied that undocumented persons might not
be entitled to other constitutional protections. See also Holley v. Lavine, 529 F.2d 1294 (2d Cir.
1976) in which an illegal Canadian alien sought to invalidate a state statute insofar as it deprived
undocumented persons and their children of welfare benefits. The district court had dismissed
the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court of appeal
reversed, stating:
[W]e cannot say that the claims are wholly insubstantial or obviously frivolous or that
decisions of the Supreme Court foreclose the subject. The Supreme Court has appar-
ently never dealt with the equal protection rights of illegal aliens in this context. Cf.
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371, 91 S. Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed. 2d. 534 (1971); See
also Bolanos v. Kiley, 509 F.2d 1023, 1025 (2d Cir. 1975). Nor is the claim that children
whose parents are illegal aliens have their own rights to benefits an insubstantial one.
Cf. Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 92 S. Ct. 1400, 31 L.Ed. 2d
768 (1972). We do not characterize plaintiff's constitutional arguments as persuasive;
we hold merely that the district judge could not dismiss them out of hand.
529 F.2d at 1295-96.
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ed aliens are hesitant to pursue legal actions in the United States. 62
Because undocumented aliens reside in the United States in violation of
federal immigration laws, they have some of the same status characteristics
as lawfully admitted resident aliens and nonresident aliens. Undocumented
aliens are like lawfully admitted aliens in that they reside within the territory
of the United States. On the other hand, they are like nonresident aliens in
that the federal government has not granted them permission to enter the
United States. Thus, the legal rights of undocumented aliens can be analy-
zed in relation to the legal status of these other two groups.
A nonresident alien has no constitutional right to enter the United
States.63 The conditions and terms of entry into the United States are solely
within the discretion of Congress. 64 Nonresident aliens are thus entitled only
to the proper functioning of the immigration process as established by
Congress. 65 The Supreme Court has consistently held that "[w]hatever the
procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien
denied entry is concerned.''66 In Kleindienst v. Mandel,67 a nonresident
alien sought admission to the United States for the purpose of lecturing on
Marxism. The Supreme Court upheld the federal government's denial of
entry notwithstanding the claims of United States citizens that their First
Amendment right to receive information was unconstitutionally abridged.6"
In so holding, the Court reaffirmed that the unadmitted nonresident alien has
no constitutional right of entry.
69
In contrast, state action adversely affecting nonresident aliens has been
invalidated. In Zschernig v. Miller,70 the Supreme Court struck down an
62. Aside from deportation cases initiated by the federal government, undocumented
persons are not involved in many legal actions. Undocumented persons bave been reluctant to
take part in or initiate legal actions because they fear that their illegal status may be discovered.
See Ortega, supra note 1, at 252-53. Moreover, an undocumented person's right to maintain a
civil action to protect his or her rights has not been clearly established. See Comment, The
Right of an Illegal Alien to Maintain a Civil Action, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 762 (1975).
63. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972).
64. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 794 (1977).
65. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953). See also
Gordon, The Alien and the Constitution, 9 CAL. W. L. REV. 1, 21-22 (1972); Note, Ideological
Restrictions on Immigration, 8 U.C.D. L. REv. 217, 222 (1975).
66. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950).
67. 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
68. Id. at 765-70.
69. Id. at 762. See also Pilapil v. INS, 424 F.2d 6 (10th Cir. 1970) in which the court stated:
Petitioner admits he is a nonimmigrant with alien status for the sole purpose of being a
student in the United States admitted subject to specific conditions.
Before this limited status was granted to respondent [sic], he had no rights under
the Constitution, laws or government of the United States. As a citizen and national of
another country his rights were established by the alien law peculiar to his native
domicile.
Id. at 11.
70. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
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Oregon statute that allowed a nonresident alien heir to inherit property only
upon proof that the alien would receive the benefits of the property without
confiscation by his country's government. This statute was held to be an
unconstitutional state intrusion into foreign affairs and international rela-
tions. 7' Although not decided on the basis of the protection to be accorded
an alien, the case reaffirmed the proposition that states have considerably
less power over nonresident aliens than the federal government has.
72
The rights of lawfully admitted resident aliens, on the other hand, are
afforded greater constitutional protection. Mere presence within the United
States endows an individual with certain constitutional rights.73 The rights
of lawfully admitted resident aliens, however, are not co-extensive with the
rights of citizens. 74 Congress has broad power over resident aliens as a
concomitant of the plenary federal power over immigration and naturaliza-
tion. 75 An act of Congress that treats aliens differently from citizens does not
in itself constitute "invidious discrimination." 76 Nevertheless, the federal
government lacks, the power arbitrarily to subject all resident aliens to
different substantive rules from those applied to citizens.
77
71. Id. at 441.
72. See Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947); Note, The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82
HARV. L.. REv. 95, 238-45 (1968).
73. In Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950), German functionaries convicted by an
American military court in China of aiding the Japanese war effort in that country sought a writ
of habeas corpus. They were imprisoned in Germany and had spent no part of their captivity
within the United States or its territories. The Court denied relief, stating that "in extending
constitutional protections beyond the citizenry, the Court has been at pains to point out that it
was the alien's presence within its territorial jurisdiction which gave the judiciary power to
act." Id. at 771. Moreover, the Court stated, "the privilege of litigation has been extended to
aliens, whether friendly or enemy, only because permitting their presence in the country
implied protection." Id. at 777-78. See also Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S.
481, 491-92 (1931); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). See generally Travers, The
Constitutional Status of State and Federal Government Discrimination Against Resident Aliens,
16 HARV. INT'L L.J. 113 (1975), in which the author states:
The territorial basis for the application of constitutional guarantees to aliens thus
appears to be an important standard by which the Court has attempted to reconcile the
interest of the United States and the individual states in freedom from foreign domina-
tion and the interest of noncitizens in avoiding arbitrary treatment at the hands of a
society to which they have manifold and substantial attachments.
Id. at 127.
74. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 78 (1976); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580,
586 (1952). See also Note, Immigrants, Aliens, and the Constitution, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW.
1075, 1087 (1974); Comment, The Alien and the Constitution, 20 U. Cm. L. REV. 547, 564
(1953).
75. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976).
76. Id. at 80.
77. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 101-02 (1976).
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The constitutional protection from discriminatory state regulation ac-
corded to lawfully admitted resident aliens is far greater. 7s State discrimina-
tion against lawfully admitted resident aliens is "invidious" for two rea-
sons. First, aliens as a class are often a prime example of a discrete and
insular minority for whom heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate.
79
Second, the federal, rather than the state, government has primary authority
in the field of immigration and naturalization.80 Thus, while state discrimi-
nation against lawfully admitted resident aliens is subject to strict judicial
scrutiny,81 discrimination by the federal government is judged by a less
stringent standard.
82
Certain limited types of state discrimination against lawfully admitted
resident aliens are, however, permissible. Lawfully admitted aliens can be
denied the right to vote, 83 the right to hold high public office84 and the right
to serve on juries. 85 These types of discrimination are justified on the basis
of the state's interest in establishing a government and in limiting participa-
tion therein to those within the basic concept of a political community.
86
Citizenship bears some rational relationship to defining that community A7 A
state cannot, however, favor citizens over lawfully admitted resident aliens
when allocating state benefits,88 since there is no reason to deny aliens as a
class state benefits when aliens, like citizens, support state government
through their taxes. 89 Denial of state benefits to aliens in order to conserve
78. Examining Bd. of Eng'rs, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572
(1976); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
79. Examining Bd. of Eng'rs, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572,
602 (1976); see text accompanying notes 185-220 infra.
80. Id. at 602.
81. Id.; Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971). But see Foley v. Connelie, 46
U.S.L.W. 4237 (U.S. Mar. 22, 1978).
82. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 101-02 (1976); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S.
67, 82 (1976).
83. Skafte v. Rorex, 553 P.2d 830 (Colo. 1976), appeal dismissed, 430 U.S. 961 (1977). See
also Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
84. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 648 (1973).
85. Perkins v. Smith, 370 F. Supp. 134 (D. Md. 1974) (three judge court), aff'd, 426 U.S.
913 (1976). See also Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320, 332 (1972).
86. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642, 647-48 (1973).
87. Id. at 647. See also Perkins v. Smith, 370 F. Supp. 134 (D. Md. 1974), in which the
court upheld the exclusion of resident aliens from jury panels by stating:
[I]t is the process of filing for citizenship that establishes. . . loyalty; any attempt at
prior screening would undercut the efficiency and significance of existing procedures.
Therefore, although the presumption that all aliens owe no allegiance to the United
States is not valid in every case, no alternative to taking citizenship for testing
allegiance can be devised, so that we conclude that the classification is compelled by
circumstances, and that it is justifiable.
Id. at 138.
88. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374-76 (1971).
89. Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 12 (1977); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376
(1971).
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the state's resources for citizens constitutes an invidious and unconstitution-
al form of discrimination.' This principle has been applied to prohibit the
denial of free public education to resident alien children when it is available
to children of citizens. 91 Arguably, a similar result is required when undocu-
mented children are denied free public education.
The difference in these standards becomes apparent when the Supreme
Court's opinion in Graham v. Richardson92 is contrasted with its later
opinion in Mathews v. Diaz.93 In Graham, the Court invalidated a state
statute that denied resident aliens welfare benefits unless they met a dura-
tional residency requirement. 94 Five years later, in Mathews, the Court
upheld a federal statute that denied resident aliens federal medical insurance
unless they met a durational residency requirement. 95 In upholding the
federal statute in Mathews, the Court distinguished Graham, stating that:
Insofar as state welfare policy is concerned, there is little, if any,
basis for treating persons who are citizens of another state differ-
ently from persons who are citizens of another country. Both
groups are noncitizens as far as the State's interests in administer-
ing its welfare programs are concerned. Thus, a division by a State
of the category of persons who are not citizens of that state into
subcategories of United States citizens and aliens has no apparent
justification, whereas a comparable classification by the Federal
Government is a routine and normally legitimate part of its busi-
ness. Furthermore, whereas the Constitution inhibits every
State's power to restrict travel across its own borders, Congress is
explicitly empowered to exercise that type of control over travel
across the borders of the United States.R
Thus, state statutes denying aliens state government jobs97 or the right to
engage in other occupations98 have been held unconstitutional, while the
validity of similar prohibitions by the federal government is unclear.
99
90. Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 12 (1977); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374
(1971).
91. See Hosier v. Evans, 314 F. Supp. 316, 319 (D.V.I. 1970). See also Nyquist v.
Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977) (invalidating state statute barring certain resident aliens from state
financial assistance for higher education).
92. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
93. 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
94. 403 U.S. at 376.
95. 426 U.S. at 83-84.
96. Id. at 85.
97. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
98. Examining Bd. of Eng'rs, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572
(1976) (denial of engineering license); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (exclusion from law
practice); Norwick v. Nyquist, 417 F. Supp. 913 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (three judge court) (exclusion
from employment as a teacher in a public school). But see Foley v. Connelie, 46 U.S.L.W. 4237
(U.S. Mar. 22, 1978). Over fifty years ago, the Supreme Court held that lawfully admitted aliens
could not be excluded from all gainful employment by state statute. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33
(1915). But see De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
99. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100-101 (1976).
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The rights of undocumented aliens domiciled in the United States have
not been clearly defined by the courts. Although undocumented aliens are
afforded the protection of the due process clause, 100 this does not necessarily
mean that they are afforded other constitutional guarantees available to
citizens. Due process protection is qualitatively different from other
constitutional rights; 101 for example, the right to be free from arbitrary state
deprivations, which is prohibited by the due process clause, differs funda-
mentally from the right to enjoy the benefits of the state's largess. 102 Recent
decisions by lower courts have reached different results on the rights of
undocumented aliens. 10 3 The remainder of the article will explore the
100. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976).
101. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), in which the Supreme Court upheld a
state welfare regulation that placed a maximum limit on the amount of money a family could
receive. In upholding the regulation, the Court distinguished the procedural protections afford-
ed at the termination of benefits from the right of an individual to demand such benefits from
the state. The Court noted: "The Constitution may impose certain procedural safeguards upon
systems of welfare administration, Goldberg v. Kelly . . . . But the Constitution does not
empower this Court to second-guess state officials charged with the difficult responsibility of
allocating limited public welfare funds among the myriad of potential recipients." Id. at 487.
Similarly, in Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961), an
employee was summarily denied access to the site of her former employment. It was argued
that since she had no constitutional right to be there, she could not question the means used to
deny her access. The Court rejected this argument, stating, "[o]ne may not have a constitution-
al right to go to Baghdad, but the government may not prohibit one from going there unless by
means consonant with due process of law." Id. at 894. See also Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S.
134, 166-67 (1974).
102. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976), in which the Supreme Court, after stating
that undocumented persons are protected by the due process clause, id. at 77, stated that in
terms of the federal government, "[n]either the overnight visitor, the unfriendly agent of a
hostile foreign power, the resident diplomat, nor the illegal entrant, can advance even a
colorable constitutional claim to share in the bounty that a conscientious sovereign makes
available to its own citizens and some of its guests." Id. at 80. See also Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S.
464 (1977), in which the Court held that a state need not provide an indigent with nontherapeutic
abortions notwithstanding the Court's earlier holding in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), that
a state could not totally prohibit a woman from having a nontherapeutic abortion.
103. For example, in Alonso v. State, 50 Cal. App. 3d 242, 123 Cal. Rptr. 536 (1975), an
undocumented worker was denied unemployment benefits. In upholding this administrative
decision, the court stated:
[E]ven if appellant put money into the fund, he is not entitled to the benefits. An illegal
alien who enters the United States without inspection in violation of 8 United States
Code section 1251 is subject to deportation. His entry is illegal and any subsequent
acts done by him in this country would be in furtherance of that illegal entry. To allow
an illegal alien to collect unemployment benefits would reward him for his illegal entry
into this country. In essence, his entry into this country is fraudulent, and as such he
should not be allowed to profit from the illegal act.
Id. at 253-54, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 544. In reaching this conclusion, the court pointed out the
"obvious catastrophic effect upon the economic well-being of California citizens by the
tremendous influx of illegal aliens." Id. at 257, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 546. In contrast, another
division of the California Court of Appeal held in Ayala v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 54
Cal. App. 3d 676, 126 Cal. Rptr. 210 (1976) that an undocumented worker who had complied
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constitutional arguments that undocumented children could employ to chal-
lenge state statutes. The Texas statute will be used as a focal point for
analysis of the rights of such children to equal access to free public educa-
tion.
HI. Due Process Challenges
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects all
persons within the United States from state action that deprives them of life,
liberty or property without due process of law.104 It places two analytically
distinct limitations on state action. First, procedural due process prevents a
state from depriving a person of life, liberty or property without a prior
hearing.10 5 Second, substantive due process prevents a state from enacting
arbitrary and unreasonable legislation, regardless of the statute's procedural
fairness. 106 The Supreme Court has unequivocally stated that the right to due
process is guaranteed to aliens who are unlawfully in the country. 107 Un-
documented children can employ both prongs of the due process clause to
challenge state legislation that denies equal access to public education.
A. Procedural Due Process
Procedural due process differs fundamentally from equal protection
and substantive due process. The issue is not whether a state can deny
undocumented children equal access to education; rather, it is whether a
state can deprive a child of the benefit of free public education without a
prior hearing.10 8 Under Texas law, a child who is either a citizen or a lawful
with all state statutes could not be denied disability benefits solely because he was in the
country illegally. As the court stated:
To conclusively presume that an illegal alien who has been attached to the labor
force and who has in all respects complied with the sections of the Unemployment
Insurance Code cannot, simply because he is an illegal alien, collect disability benefits
is contrary to the statutes. . . . In addition, the Supreme Court of the United States
has consistently invalidated statutory or administrative classifications bottomed on
such conclusive presumptions.
Id. at 680, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 213 (citations omitted).
104. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886);
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976).
105. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1972); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565,
572-74 (1975).
106. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
107. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976), in which the Court stated:
There are literally millions of aliens within the jurisdiction of the United States.
The Fifth Amendment, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment, protects every one of
these persons from deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law. . . . Even one whose presence in this country is unlawful, involuntary, or
transitory, is entitled to that constitutional protection.
Id. at 77 (citations omitted).
108. See note 112 infra.
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resident alien can attend free public schools. 109 The state statute thus appears
to establish the right to public education as a property interest; the Supreme
Court has held that such an interest is protected by the due process clause
and may not be taken away without adherence to the minimum procedural
safeguards required by that clause. 110 If a child was not lawfully admitted
into this country, that child is not entitled to a free public education in
Texas. 1 ! Since the determination of one's status as an unlawful immigrant
will result in the loss of a protected property interest, that determination
must be made in accordance with procedural safeguards.1 12 Thus, prior to
denying a child access to free public education, a state must afford that child
procedural due process.
Once it is determined that due process applies, the question remains
what process is due. 113 Arguably, all the procedural rights afforded a person
subject to deportation' 14 should be provided in determining whether a child
is in this country illegally. 115 At a minimum, due process requires that a
person be given notice and an opportunity to be heard before the disability is
imposed. 116 The purpose of this requirement is to protect individuals from
unfair or mistaken deprivation of a protected property interest. 117 Such
deprivations can be prevented only when a person has the opportunity to
speak in his or her defense prior to the deprivation.1 8 An argument ground-
ed on procedural due process may in fact invalidate the entire statutory
scheme. The Court has held that in some situations, the due process clause
109. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 21.031 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
110. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975).
111. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 21.031 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
112. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565,579 (1975) (student cannot be suspended for ten days
without hearing to determine alleged misconduct); Fuentes v. Shevin. 407 U.S. 67 (1972)
(chattels cannot be repossessed by secured creditor without prior hearing to determine one's
right to the chattels). Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (driver's license cannot be revoked
prior to hearing to determine whether there was a reasonable possibility of a judgment against
the driver as a result of accident); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare benefits
cannot be terminated without a hearing to determine recipient's ineligibility); Wisconsin v.
Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971) (state cannot post notice denying individual right to
purchase alcoholic beverages without hearing to determine whether individual fits proscribed
status). But see Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974) (pre-hearing attachment valid
when pursuant to writ of sequestration issued by a judge on basis of a factual affidavit alleging
fear of loss of collateral).
113. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 577 (1975).
114. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1260 (1970); 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.1-244.2 (1977). See also Comment,
Alternatives to Deportation: Relief Provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.C.D.
L. REV. 323, 327 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Alternatives to Deportation] for a survey of
deportation procedures and protections.
115. See Williams v. Williams, 328 F. Supp. 1380, 1383 (D.V.I. 1971).
116. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 578-80 (1975); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S.
433, 436 (1971).
117. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972).
118. Id.; Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580 (1975).
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requires that an individual be granted a fair opportunity to rebut a statutory
presumption that is not necessarily true in fact, particularly when the state
has reasonable alternative means of making the crucial determination. 119 As
a result, a statute that employs a permanent irrebuttable presumption as the
basis for depriving an individual of a protected interest is constitutionally
disfavored. 
120
The Texas statute denies all undocumented children free public educa-
tion. Implicit in the statute is the presumption that undocumented children
represent a financial drain on the school system's limited resources because
undocumented children and their parents do not contribute to the funding of
public schools. 121 This presumption, however, is not necessarily true. The
extent of an undocumented alien's financial impact through sales, property
and income taxes is indeterminable. 12 It is clear, however, that undocu-
mented children as a group are not necessarily different than other children
in terms of the financial support to the public school system provided by
their parents. 123 To conclusively presume that all undocumented children
and their parents do not contribute to the support of public schools is a
constitutionally intolerable denial of due process.
A more serious problem arises, however, as to the substantive stan-
dards employed in deciding whether a child has been lawfully admitted into
the country. 124 In determining whether a child is a lawful resident for
educational purposes, the state will necessarily encroach upon the exclusive
authority of the federal government to regulate immigration, which is
discussed later in this article.
125
119. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (school board
regulation, which presumed that teachers in the fifth month of pregnancy were unfit to teach,
held unconstitutional); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973) (Connecticut statute, which
presumed certain university students were non-residents for out-of-state tuition purposes, held
unconstitutional); Moreno v. University of Md., 420 F. Supp. 541 (D. Md. 1976), cert. granted
sub nom. Elkins v. Moreno, 98 S. Ct. 260 (1977) (university's in-state policy, as applied to non-
immigrant aliens, created a constitutionally impermissible irrebuttable presumption).
120. See generally Note, The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 87
HARV. L. REV. 1534 (1974). Compare Tribe, From Environmental Foundations to Constitution-
a Structures: Learning from Nature's Future, 84 YALE L.J. 545 (1975) with Note, Irrebuttable
Presumptions: An Illusory Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 449 (1975).
121. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
122. See notes 18-19 and accompanying text supra, notes 171-176 and accompanying text
infra.
123. See text accompanying note 20 supra and 171-176 infra.
124. The Texas statute allows "lawfully admitted aliens" to attend free public school. TEX.
EDUC. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 21.031 (Vernon Supp. 1978). A problem of interpretation arises as to
whether lawfully admitted aliens who subsequently violate the condition of their entry and are
subject to deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1970) come within the statute and are entitled to
free public education. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11104 (West 1972).
125. See text accompanying notes 314-67 infra.
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B. Substantive Due Process
Even with the institution of constitutionally adequate procedures, the
Texas scheme could be challenged as a violation of substantive due process
rights. Unlike procedural due process, substantive due process limitations
focus on what a state can do rather than how it must do it. 126 Until 1937, the
Supreme Court utilized substantive due process as a tool to invalidate a
substantial number of laws dealing with social and economic matters.127
Discredited by overuse and lack of judicial restraint, 121 substantive due
process has for many years taken a back seat to equal protection in the
preservation of personal liberties and rights. 129 Unlike equal protection,
which looks at comparative classifications, substantive due process looks at
the relative importance of the right at issue and the extent to which it is
burdened by state law. 130 In recent years, there has been renewed interest in
this form of analysis. 3 '
Substantive due process rights are not limited to those specifically
enumerated in the Bill of Rights. 132 Rather, due process prevents a state
from violating fundamental concepts of justice that are basic to our civil and
political institutions. 133 One such fundamental concept protected by the due
process clause is the idea that punishment must be predicated upon personal
guilt. 134 In Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 135 the Supreme Court
126. See Stone, Introduction: Due Progress of "Due Process," 25 HAsTINGs L.J. 785, 794-
96 (1974).
127. See E. BARRETr, JR. & P. BRUTON, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 713
n.1 (4th ed. 1973). The case commonly viewed as marking the Court's abandonment of the
substantive due process doctrine is West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
128. See generally McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhu-
mation and Reburial, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 34.
129. See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1,42
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Foreword].
130. Bartlett, Pregnancy and the Constitution: The Uniqueness Trap, 62 CALIF. L. REV.
1532, 1541 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Bartlett).
131. See Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972-Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due
Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1973).
132. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973); Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609, 614 (5th
Cir. 1972) (en banc).
133. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,67 (1932) (quoting Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312,
316 (1926)); St. Ann v. Palisi, 495 F.2d 423, 425 (5th Cir. 1974).
134. See Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961) in which the Court stated:
In our jurisprudence guilt is personal, and when the imposition of punishment on a
status or on conduct can only be justified by reference to the relationship of that status
or.conduct to other concededly criminal activity (here advocacy of violent overthrow
[of the government of the United States]), that relationship must be sufficiently
substantial to satisfy the concept of personal guilt in order to withstand attack under
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Id. at 224-25.
135. 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
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invalidated a state workers' compensation law that discriminated against
illegitimate children.
[I]mposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the
basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some
relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing. Obvious-
ly, no child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the illegiti-
mate child is an ineffectual-as well as unjust-way of deterring
the parent.
13 6
State laws that deprive undocumented children of equal access to
education punish the children for a status that they, like illegitimate chil-
dren, cannot control. The primary role of the parents in the upbringing and
control of minor children and the destiny of the family is beyond ques-
tion. 137 The status of undocumented children is attributable to parents who
illegally immigrate to the United States in response-to economic conditions
beyond their control. 138 Moreover, the undocumented child commits no
crime by being in this country illegally; he is subject to deportation only at
the behest of federal authorities. 139 Consequently, by denying undocument-
ed children equal access to public education, state authorities create a
disability not contemplated by federal law1'4 and based on a status that has
been foisted upon the undocumented child.
136. Id. at 175. See also Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 769-70; New Jersey Welfare
Rights Organization v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619, 620 (1973).
137. The Supreme Court on numerous occasions has recognized the parent's primary role
in the upbringing of children and the affairs of the family. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 232 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 166 (1944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). In particular, see Miller v. Superior Court, 69 Cal. App. 3d 191, 138
Cal. Rptr. 123 (1977) (hearing granted July 21, 1977):
In spite of recent developments in the law giving recognition to the rights of
children, vis-a-vis the government and the judicial system, there still exists a recog-
nized need for parental control and parental decisionmaking before which the child's
rights and desires must yield. One such area of decisionmaking is with certain limited
exceptions, the location of residence.
Id. at 200, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 127. See also In re Roger S., 19 Cal. 3d 921,569 P.2d 1286, 141 Cal.
Rptr. 298 (1977); In re John S., 66 Cal. App. 3d 343, 135 Cal. Rptr. 893 (1977); J. L. v. Parham,
412 F. Supp. 112 (M.D. Ga. 1976) (three judge court), prob. juris. noted, 431 U.S. 936 (1977),
which deal with the right of a parent to commit an unconsenting child to a mental hospital.
138. See United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 901-02 (1975) (appendix to concurring
opinion of Burger, C.J.); SAMonA, supra note 19, at 94-96; Comment, Illegal Aliens and
Enforcement: Present Practices & Proposed Legislation, 8 U.C.D. L. REv. 127, 128 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Illegal Aliens and Enforcement].
139. Illegal Aliens and Enforcement, supra note 138, at 138 n.84. See also Metalworking
Mach., Inc. v. Superior Court, 69 Cal. App. 3d 791, 796, 138 Cal. Rptr. 369, 371 (1977).
140. See Williams v. Williams, 328 F. Supp. 1380 (D.V.I. 1971), holding that an illegal alien
may not be denied access to state divorce courts. The court stated: "The enforcement of
immigration laws properly remains with those to whom it is entrusted by law and does not need
in aid of enforcement the judicially created civil disability of exclusion from our divorce
courts." Id. at 1383.
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The requirements of due process, however, do not apply to all state-
created disabilities. To fall within the ambit of the due process clause,
undocumented children must demonstrate that the Texas statute deprives
them of a protected interest in either liberty or property.14' Although liberty
and property are broadly defined for purposes of the due process clause,
they are not unlimited. 142 The property interests protected by the United
States Constitution 143 are defined by reference to state statutes or rules that
grant certain benefits. 144 Undocumented children cannot claim that they
have been denied a property right because the Texas education code specif-
ically excludes undocumented children from the benefit of free public
education. 145 Consequently, the Texas statute precludes the excluded benefit
from being a protected property interest. 146
Public education, however, can be considered an interest in liberty
meriting protection. Unlike property interests, liberty interests are inher-
ently less susceptible to precise definition. Yet, the meaning of liberty is
broad. 147 It encompasses those privileges long recognized as essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by a free people. 148 In describing the scope of
protected liberty interests, the Supreme Court has made it clear that more
than freedom from bodily restraint is involved. 149
Education is basic to a free society.150 The Supreme Court has held that
a restraint on the teaching of foreign language in any public or private school
to any child who had not passed the eighth grade interferes with a protected
141. See St. Ann v. Palisi, 495 F.2d 423, 426-27 (5th Cir. 1974).
142. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1972).
143. Id. at 577; Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 572-73 (1975).
144. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,577 (1972); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565,572-
73 (1975).
145. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 21.031 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
146. In contrast, see Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975): "Having chosen to extend the
[property] right to people of appellee's class generally, Ohio may not w ithdraw that right...
absent fundamentally fair procedures .... .. Id. at 574.
147. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972).
148. Id.; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
149. As the Supreme Court stated in Meyer:
While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness the-liberty. . . guaran-
teed [by the Fourteenth Amendment], the term has received much consideration and
some of the included things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denoted not
merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to
engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to
marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the
dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized
• . . as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.
262 U.S. at 399.
150. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1973);
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). See also Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of
Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
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liberty. 151 Similarly, it has held that a state statute mandating attendance at
public schools interferes with a protected liberty. 152 If a student's right to
attend private school or to learn a foreign language is a protected liberty
interest, it would appear that a student's right to attend public school-
indeed, to attend school at all-must also be protected.
Although the United States Supreme Court declined to deem education
a fundamental interest for purposes of equal protection analysis, 153 this does
not affect the determination of whether it is a liberty interest protected by the
due process clause. 154 By denying undocumented children free public edu-
cation, Texas deprives them of a valuable liberty interest without due
process. 155 When such a violation of due process has been found, the state
must satisfy a substantial burden to justify its action. 156 Texas' interest in
denying undocumented children equal access to public education is ostens-
ibly fiscal: the state wants to save money. 157 Concern for fiscal integrity is
not, however, sufficient justification for such a significant deprivation.
158
IV. Equal Protection Challenge
The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment embodies
three analytically separate limitations on the legislative power of a state159 to
151. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
152. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
153. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
154. St. Ann v. Palisi, 495 F.2d 423, 429 (5th Cir. 1974); see Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565
(1975); Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
155. See Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976), in which the Supreme Court
overturned a federal civil service regulation denying aliens employment in federal civil service
jobs. There the Court stated:
[I]neligibility for employment in a major sector of the economy ... is of sufficient
significance to be characterized as a deprivation of an interest in liberty. Indeed we
deal with a rule which deprives a discrete class of persons of an interest in liberty on a
wholesale basis. By reason of the Fifth Amendment, such a deprivation must be
accompanied by due process.
Id. at 102-03. But see De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976), in which the Court refused to
sustain a lower court's determination that a state statute which effectively denied undocument-
ed workers employment within California by making it a crime for employers to hire them was
unconstitutional. This case, however, was decided on the narrow ground that not all state
legislation affecting undocumented persons is necessarily preempted, and did not discuss the
due process or equal protection ramifications of such a statute.
156. St. Ann v. Palisi, 495 F.2d 423, 427 (5th Cir. 1974).
157. See text accompanying notes 13-20 supra.
158. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 375 (1971). See also Hosier v. Evans, 314 F.
Supp. 316, 320-21 (D.V.I. 1970) (federal district court stated that non-citizens could not be
denied access to public schools to save the school district money); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645 (1972) ("The Constitution recognizes higher values than speed & efficiency." Id. at 652.)
159. Barrett, Judicial Supervision of Legislative Classifications-A More Modest Role for
Equal Protection?, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REv. 89, 90 [hereinafter cited as Barrett].
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treat similarly situated persons differently.110 First, a legislative classifica-
tion is invalid if it is not rationally related to a legitimate state purpose.
161
Second, certain bases of classification that are "suspect" may be used, if at
all, only in unusual circumstances. 162 Finally, the classification may not
interfere to an impermissible extent with the exercise of a "fundamental"
right.
163
Statutes such as the one enacted in Texas treat children who reside
within that state differently from one another. The statute differentiates
between children who are citizens or who are legally in the United States
and children who are in the country illegally, i.e., without documents.
1 64
This classification is the basis for providing tuition-free public education to
some children, while denying it to others. 1 65 Apart from their immigration
status, however, which is a distinction created by the federal government to
serve federal purposes, the children are similarly situated, particularly with
regard to financial contributions.
Various state and local funds, supplemented by federal aid, 166 support
Texas public schools. The state's contribution comes from a variety of
sources, including a state ad valorem property tax and the state's general
revenues. 167 These contributions support the Texas Minimum Foundation
School Program; 168 its funds are in turn earmarked for operating expenses,
transportation costs, and teachers' salaries. 169 The contributions of local
160. F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
161. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976); USDA v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 538
(1973).
162. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976); Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971).
163. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29 (1973); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). For a more detailed explanation of equal protection analysis
and standards, see text accompanying notes 177-84 infra.
164. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 21.031 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
165. Id. The code provides that those children who are citizens or legally admitted aliens
can attend the public free schools and are entitled to the benefits of the Available School Fund.
By negative implication, those children who do not have such status are not entitled to the rights
mentioned in the statute. Some school districts have begun to require tuition fees of some
children. See text accompanying notes 14-17 supra.
166. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 9 n.21 (1973). In
1970-71, state aid accounted for 48% of funds for Texas schools, local funds for 41.1%, and
federal sources contributed 10.9%. Id. at 12.
167. The Texas Constitution and the Texas Education Code delineate how state education
funds are raised and allocated. See TEX. CONST. art. 7, §§ 1-5; TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN, tit. 2, §
16.251 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
168. The Texas Minimum Foundation School Program was enacted by the Texas Legisla-
ture to offset disparities in local spending and to meet changing educational requirements in
Texas. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 9 (1973).
169. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 16.251(a) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
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school districts are derived from the issuance of bonds and the collection of
ad valorem property taxes. 170 Undocumented aliens who own property are
not immune from payment of property taxes, 171 and the majority of undocu-
mented aliens, who live in rented accommodations, contribute to the proper-
ty tax through their rental payments. 172 Undocumented aliens also pay state
and federal income taxes. 173 In fact, some pay more taxes than are re-
quired. 174 On balance, a recent study concludes, they pay more in taxes than
they collect in services. 17 Thus, undocumented children are similarly
situated with children who are entitled to tuition-free public education
because parents of both groups finance the public school system. 176
170. TEX. CONST. art. 7, § 3 (ad valorem property taxes); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 20.01-
20.08, 20.21-20.27 (Vernon 1972 & Supp. 1978) (bonds).
171. See Kirsh, California Illegal Aliens: They Give More Than They Take, NEW WEST,
May 23, 1977, at 26.
172. See SAN DIEGO STUDY, supra note 16, in which of the undocumented aliens inter-
viewed, 61% lived in rented accommodations, 23% lived in rent-free housing provided by their
employer, 10% lived under a tree or in a hole in an open field, 4% lived in tents or garages, 1%
lived in cars and 1% did not respond. Id. at xxiii.
173. SAN DIEGO STUDY, supra note 16, at xi.
174. Id.
175. The Wall Street Journal, after discussing a recent study by the United States Depart-
ment of Labor, stated that that study "refutes the widespread belief that the aliens are
freeloading. . . . The government is obviously getting more than it gives." Diamond, supra
note 19, at 108. See Cook, An Economic Analysis: How Illegal Aliens Pay as They Go, NEW
WsT, May 23, 1977, at 34. Similarly, in the San Diego study it was noted that:
Some of the preceding conclusions indicate an impact by illegal aliens on such social
service areas as health care, welfare, and education. However, considering that the
estimated number of illegal aliens residing in San Diego is 92,138, and that their
participation in social service programs may be considered quantitatively minimal,
therefore the study concludes that the impact may be less than originally perceived by
the general public when the impact is viewed. This impact may be mitigated when
considering that illegal aliens are presumed to pay federal and state taxes, social
security, and disability insurance through payroll deductions for services they mostly
never benefit from.
This conclusion is consistent with research studies on illegal aliens . . . [which]
indicate the United States government is receiving much more from the illegal aliens in
the form of tax and social security deductions than what the illegal aliens receive in
social services.
SAN DIEGO STUDY, supra note 16, at 178-79.
176. See Ortega, supra note 1, at 253.
The curious argument for keeping these children out of school is that there are so
many of them. The argument is curious because it is made by "educators" and
because they are, in essence, saying "We would admit you if there were only a few of
you, but since there are 50,000 of you, we can't. It is less unconscionable to us to see
50,000 children without any education walking the streets of Los Angeles that if there
were only a few." Their stated reason for not admitting them is that these children are
a financial burden on the district. But all children are a burden on a district. The fact is
that these children and their parents pay taxes and contribute to the economic well-
being of the community the same as residents.
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Legislation distinguishing undocumented children may, therefore, be
tested under traditional equal protection analysis. Under the "two-tiered"
model, 177 most classifications are tested by a rational basis standard, which,
it has been argued, involves minimal scrutiny in theory and practically none
in fact. 171 On the other hand, if a legislative classification is based on
"suspect" criteria or impinges on a "fundamental" interest, a more rigor-
ous or "strict" scrutiny of the legislative action is invoked, which most
often results in the invalidation of the legislative action. 179 Characterizing a
class as suspect or a right as fundamental is thus a critical element in
assessing the constitutionality of a legislative action under the equal protec-
tion clause.' 80 The inflexibility of this approach has led to dissatisfaction
with the model,' 8 ' inconsistent results, 182 and decisions that fail to identify
the standard employed. 8 3 The resulting confusion has prompted at least two
Supreme Court justices and various commentators to call for an alternative
approach to equal protection adjudication.18 4 This section will examine the
Texas statute under the traditional two-tiered model as well as under the
balancing approach advocated by Justice Marshall.
A. Undocumented Children as a Suspect Class
Although a state is not barred by the equal protection clause from
creating statutory classifications, some classifications are so disfavored that
strict judicial scrutiny is mandated.' 8 5 In the now-famous "footnote four"
of United States v. Carolene Products, Co. 186 the Court began to carve out a
principled basis for departure from general principles of judicial restraint in
the area of equal protection analysis. Justice Stone, writing for the Court,
recognized the possibility that "prejudice against discrete and insular
minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the
177. See Foreword, supra note 129, at 8.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Bartlett, supra note 130, at 1538.
181. See Foreword, supra note 129, at 17.
182. See Nowak, Realigning the Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Guaran-
tee-Prohibited, Neutral, and Permissive Classifications, 62 GEo. L.J. 1071, 1074 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Nowak]; Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, the Equal Protection Clause, and
the Three Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61 VA. L. REV. 945, 952 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Wilkinson].
183. See Nowak, supra note 182, at 1073; Wilkinson, supra note 182, at 952.
184. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307. 318-27 (1976) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 518-23 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-110 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 517-30 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting). See
generally Foreword, supra note 129; Nowak, supra note 182; Wilkinson, supra note 182.
185. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976).
186. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
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operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judi-
cial inquiry." 187 This classic, yet enigmatic description does not provide an
adequate analytic framework for determining whether a classification should
be designated as suspect. 188 Subsequent decisions have nevertheless applied
the principle, identifying as suspect classifications based on race,189 alien-
age 90 and national origin.191
Recent decisions have articulated additional indicia that point to a
suspect classification. The Court's opinion in San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez'19 admonished courts to consider whether the
class "is not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of
purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majorita-
rian political process." 193 These additional indicia are also broad and impre-
cise. 194 They do not define what quantum or quality of discrimination is
required, 195 nor how long or how recently the group as a class must have
suffered discriminatory treatment. 196 It is not clear what is meant by political
powerlessness, or how it is to be judged.197
The vagueness of the Rodriguez formulation has prompted some
commentators to accuse the Court of determining suspectness on the basis of
what the Court "feels."' 198 The Court has clearly limited the number of
187. Id. at 152-53 n.4.
188. See Wilkinson, supra note 182, at 980. Justice Rehnquist has pointed out with regard
to this definition that "[our] society, consisting of over 200 million individuals of multitudinous
origins, customs, tongues, beliefs, and cultures is, to say the least, diverse. It would hardly take
extraordinary ingenuity for a lawyer to find 'insular and discrete' minorities at every turn in the
road." Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 657 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
189. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
190. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
191. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
Each of the classifications in the above cases involved the imposition of burdens upon groups
that are prime examples of discrete and insular minorities.
192. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
193. Id. at 28. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685-86 (1973).
194. See generally Wilkinson, supra note 182, at 980-83. Professor Wilkinson critiques the
factors that Justice Brennan found relevant in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685-86
(1973) for determining whether or not a classification is suspect. The criticism that Wilkinson
makes of Justice Brennan's factors is equally applicable to the indicia noted in San Antonio.
Justice Powell's language in San Antonio is as broad, general, and abstract as Justice Brennan's
in Frontiero. Similarly, Justice Powell's indicia are as undefined as are the terms used in Justice
Brennan's factors.
195. See Wilkinson, supra note 182, at 981.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. In Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), the Court simply labelled alienage,
without explanation, as "a prime example" of a discrete and insular minority "for whom such
heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate," id. at 371-72, as contemplated in Carolene
Products. Id.
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classes that are accorded heightened protection. In Mathews v. Lucas, 199 it
found illegitimacy not to be a suspect criterion. The stated rationale for the
holding was that "illegitimacy does not carry an obvious badge, as race or
sex do, [and] this discrimination against illegitimates has never approached
the severity or pervasiveness of the historic legal and political discrimination
against women and Negroes."21 It should be pointed out that the Court in
Mathews failed to explain why alienage is "a prime example" of a discrete
and insular minority notwithstanding its lack of an inherently "obvious
badge."
201
The Court reached a similar result with regard to old age in Mas-
sachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia.202 In that case, the Court stated
that it found no unique disabilities connected with old age, noting that old
age simply marks a stage in life to which most people are subject.203 The
Court also found that there had been no history of purposeful, unequal
treatment of the aged that was based on stereotyped characteristics that were
not truly indicative of ability.
204
In Frontiero v. Richardson,205 which involved sex-based discrimina-
tion against women, the plurality opinion sought to add sex to the list of
suspect classifications, focusing on factors other than those articulated in
San Antonio. In Frontiero, Justice Brennan noted three factors that were
considered relevant to the determination. One commentator has described
them as follows:
(1) that the suspect classes suffer from "an immutable charac-
teristic determined solely by the accident of birth," which "bears
no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society";
(2) that suspect classes have suffered historical vilification, as
illustrated by Justice Brennan's assertion that the 19th century"position of women in our society was, in many respects, compa-
rable to that of blacks under the pre-Civil War slave codes"; and
(3) that the suspect class, largely because of past discrimination,
lacks effective political power and redress.
2°6
Justice Brennan's relevant factors are not without their own limitations. The
use of these factors excludes alienage as a suspect class because the status is
not immutable.207 The factors articulated also suffer from a lack of precision
and concreteness. Justice Brennan's arguments carried little weight, how-
199. 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
200. Id. at 506.
201. See note 198 supra.
202. 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
203. Id. at 313.
204. Id.
205. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
206. See Wilkinson, supra note 182, at 980.
207. Id.
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ever; sex has not been recognized as a suspect classification by a majority of
the Court. 20 8 Nor has Justice Brennan carried forward his own argument. In
a more recent case involving sex discrimination, his majority opinion does
not even discuss sex as a suspect classification.
209
The Court's inability thoroughly to define or consistently to apply a set
of criteria for determining suspectness has created latent confusion in the
area of equal protection.21 0 Under the traditional two-tiered model of re-
view, 211 undocumented aliens generally, and undocumented children specif-
ically, could constitute a suspect class. Undocumented aliens individually
and as a group are politically powerless. Like lawful resident aliens, un-
documented aliens are not guaranteed the right to vote.212 Consequently,
they are dependent on others to protect their interests. The political power-
lessness of undocumented children is more severe because they cannot rely
on their parents to protect their interests. Additionally, undocumented aliens
have historically been the target of purposeful legal, economic and social
discrimination and exploitation. 213 Moreover, most of the undocumented
children in Texas are of Mexican ancestry. 214 They share with other ethnic
and racial minorities physical, cultural and language characteristics that set
them apart from the Anglo majority and make them identifiable as part of a
distinct and insular minority. 215 In addition, the classification is based, like
race and national origin, on a characteristic, their migration status, over
which the children have no control.216 Since undocumented children suffer
the full range of disabilities and are discriminated against for reasons
208. Justices Douglas, White and Marshall joined Justice Brennan in finding sex-based
classifications to be suspect. 411 U.S. at 678, 688. Justice Stewart concurred in the judgment,
id. at 691 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment), based on the Court's opinion in Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). In Reed, it was held that the means (statutory preference for selection
of males over females in the administration of decedents' estates) were so unrelated to the
objective (to decrease litigation by statutorily narrowing the class of possible administrators) as
to be unconstitutionally arbitrary under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Justice Powell, concurring in the judgment and joined by Justice Blackmun and by Chief
Justice Burger, felt that Reed was sufficient authority and that it would be improper to expand
the Reed rationale at that time. 411 U.S. at 691-92 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment). The
Court since then has consistently cited Reed and has not characterized sex as "suspect." See,
e.g., Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1971); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
209. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
210. See Wilkinson, supra note 182, at 978.
211. See notes 177-80 and accompanying text supra; see generally Massachusetts Bd. of
Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 318-21 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
212. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 646-48 (1973).
213. See text accompanying notes 50-55 supra.
214. See note 16 supra.
215. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 197-98 (1973).
216. See Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175-76 (1972) (illegitimate children
have no control over their status and ought not be made to suffer on account of it).
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unrelated to their worth as individuals, they deserve extraordinary judicial
protection.
217
The designation of undocumented children as a suspect class would be
tantamount to invalidation of the Texas statutory classification. 218 Mere
fiscal interest would not be sufficient to justify the unequal treatment of
undocumented children. 219 It is equally clear, however, that the Court has
been hesitant to expand the number of classifications designated as sus-
pect.
220
B. Education as a Fundamental Right
The equal protection clause prohibits a state from burdening fundamen-
tal interests. In this analysis, the focus shifts from an examination of the
classification to the type of interest burdened.22' If an individual can show
that a classification serves to penalize the exercise of a constitutionally
protected or fundamental right, the state must prove that the classification is
necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest.222 Absent such a
showing, the classification will be invalidated.
The initial determination is whether the right in question is fundamental
for purposes of equal protection analysis. The key is "assessing whether the
right is explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution." 223 In San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez ,224 the Court examined
217. In recent decisions, however, the Supreme Court has refused to enlarge the number of
suspect classifications. In each of these cases, the classifications in question did not meet the
Court's criteria. See Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 506 (1976) (illegitimacy not an "obvious
badge" and' no history of purposeful discrimination); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976) (old age marks a stage in life, no history of purposeful
unequal treatment, no unique disabilities); San Antonio Independent Schol Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (no history of purposeful unique treatment of residents of low-wealth
districts, nor are they relegated to a position of political powerlessness).
218. See Barrett, supra note 159, at 94. Only once has the Supreme Court upheld discrimi-
nation against a suspect class. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
219. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 375 (1971); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,
633 (1969).
220. See text accompanying notes 199-209 supra.
221. Legislative discrimination against constitutionally protected interests will normally be
held invalid, either by applying the underlying constitutional provision or by the employment of
equal protection analysis. See Barrett, supra note 159, at 108-09. Where a classification
burdens a constitutional right to such a degree as to be inconsistent N ith the constitutional
protection afforded the interest, it will also be held invalid. This normally requires a balancing
process to determine if the state interest is sufficiently important to justify the burden on the
protected right. Id. at 110. In this case, the Texas statute is burdening the undocumented child's
right lo an education by authorizing local districts to require such a child to pay tuition.
222. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
223. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973). But see
Wilkinson, supra note 182, at 952.
224. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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whether education is a fundamental right in the context of a challenge to a
state financing scheme that created financial disparities among school dis-
tricts. 2 5 Writing for the majority, Justice Powell noted that free public
education is not "afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitu-
tion. "226 He went on to hold that there was no basis for finding it implicitly
protected in the context of this challenge. 227 Justice Powell's opinion in San
Antonio offers no guidance for determining whether a right is implicitly
guaranteed by the Constitution.
228
The situation of undocumented children in the Texas schools differs
radically from the circumstances of the children in San Antonio. In contrast
to the differential spending levels involved in San Antonio,229 the Texas
statute effectively denies education to all undocumented children.2 0 In
upholding the Texas scheme of financing in San Antonio, the Court noted
that its underlying purpose was to extend and improve education. 231 In
contrast, the purpose and effect of the amendment to the Texas statute is to
selectively deny education to a class of politically unpopular individuals.
232
In San Antonio, the Court expressly left open the question of whether
the absolute denial of education might impinge on a constitutionally protect-
ed right. 233 It was argued by respondents in San Antonio that education is a
fundamental right because of its "peculiarly close relationship to other
rights and liberties accorded protection under the Constitution.'"234 Specific-
ally, it was argued that education is necessary for the effective exercise of
First Amendment and voting rights.235 The Court's opinion in San Antonio
225. Id. at 35, 37.
226. Id. at 35.
227. Id. at 37. The Court found unpersuasive the argument that education is a fundamental
right because it is essential to the effective exercise of First Amendment freedoms and to an
intelligent exercise of the right to vote. Id. It observed that it did not possess "either
the ability or the authority to guarantee to the citizenry the most effective speech or the most
informed electoral choice." Id. at 36. The Court went on to point out that no argument could be
made that the Texas system failed to provide the basic minimal skills necessary for the
enjoyment of the rights of free speech and voting. Id. at 37. It also noted that the Texas
scheme was remedial in nature and was an effort to extend public education and to improve
its quality. Id. at 39.
228. In discussing interstate travel as a fundamental right, however, Justice Powell noted
that it has "long been recognized as a right of constitutional significance." Id. at 32. Although it
has no source in a particular constitutional provision, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630
(1968), the right to interstate travel is fundamental to the concept of the federal union. United
States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-58 (1966).
229. 411 U.S. at 37.
230. See text accompanying notes 10-17 supra.
231. 411 U.S. at 39.
232. See notes 10-17 and accompanying text supra.
233. 411 U.S. at 36-37.
234. Id. at 35.
235. Id.
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admitted that this argument would have had more immediacy had education
been absolutely denied. 236 A total denial would seriously limit an individu-
al's ability to participate in the governmental process.2 37 The Court itself has
recognized elsewhere that the individual can be severely injured as a result
of the denial of education for more than a "trivial" period.238 The cost to
society in general must also be considered. 239 One court noted that denying
education to a group of lawfully admitted, non-immigrant children could
"develop and foster a ghetto of ignorance, with countless numbers of
untrained, untutored and perhaps untended children . . . roaming the
streets, this with the concommitant [sic] evils of crime, immorality and
general social degeneracy."240
Assuming then that there is a protected right to some minimum amount
of education, 241 Texas must demonstrate that a classification that effectively
denies education to undocumented children serves a compelling state inter-
est.242 This is a heavy burden: when the Court has applied this standard, the
challenged legislation has frequently been invalidated. 243 Again, the state's
fiscal concerns would not be sufficient justification. 244 Nevertheless, even if
it can be established that there is a fundamental right to some quantum of
education, additional problems arise. First, the "nexus" arguments, that
education is necessary to properly exercise the protected rights of free
speech and voting,245 may not be as strong when aliens are involved.
Although aliens residing in this country are accorded freedom of speech, 2'
states are not required to extend to them the right to vote.247 Second, it has
236. Id. at 37.
237. Id. at 112. Admittedly, this argument has less merit with regard to nonvoting aliens.
238. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1975) (ten-day suspension).
239. Hosier v. Evans, 314 F. Supp. 316 (D.V.I. 1970).
240. Id. at 321.
241. In a recent article, Professor Tribe discussed the possible constitutional framework
for an argument in favor of some minimum level of governmental service. See Tribe, Unravel-
ing National League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Govern-
ment Services, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1977) [hereinafter cited as New Federalism]. Professor
Tribe argues that a tension exists among the rhetoric, reasoning and results in the leading cases
involving basic governmental benefits. Id. at 1079. He concludes: "That tension may well
reflect an unarticulated perception that there exist constitutional norms establishing minimal
entitlements to certain services-an intuitive sense that some expectations are protected." Id.
at 1079. Education certainly fits Tribe's definition of "certain services." The Supreme Court
has long recognized the importance of education in this society and the central role of the
government in providing for it. See generally Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Brown
v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
242. Barrett, supra note 159, at 110-11.
243. Id. at 111.
244. See text accompanying note 158 supra.
245. See text accompanying notes 233-37 supra.
246. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 148 (1945).
247. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647-49 (1973).
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not been established that undocumented aliens generally, and undocumented
children specifically, are entitled to substantive constitutional rights.
248
C. Undocumented Children as an Irrational Classification
Although a legislatively created classification may not be suspect and
may not infringe upon a fundamental right, it must nonetheless be rationally
related to a legitimate state purpose. 24 9 Legislative action will normally be
presumed valid;250 the challenging party must prove the insubstantiality of
the relation between the classification and the legislative purpose. 5 1 This
involves a two-step process. First, the legislative objective of the statute in
question must be ascertained.2 2 Once this has been accomplished, it must
be determined whether the classification serves that objective.253 An addi-
tional variable is the balance between the importance of the legislative
interest and the level of tolerable irrationality. 254 Justice Marshall has
248. See text accompanying notes 59-103 supra.
249. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762,767 (1977) (quoting Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
406 U.S. 164, 162 (1972)); USDA v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528,538 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71, 76-77 (1971).
250. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
251. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976).
252. Such a search is not without difficulty. The Supreme Court has not limited itself in the
past to accepting the purpose suggested by the plain terms of a statute. It has used various
methods to reach an independent determination. One author suggested dividing the methods
used into three groupings: "(A) ignoring any purpose, (B) stating the purpose as a unit rather
than as a mix of policies, and (C) manipulating the level of abstraction at which the purpose is
defined." Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123, 132
(1972). In the past, the Court has utilized an independent assessment to define a statute's
purpose so as to render the challenged classification inappropriate. Id. Nevertheless, it is
possible that the Court might use the same liberality to construe the purpose of a statute in such
a way as to validate the classification. Id. at 128.
It is always possible to define the legislative purpose of a statute in such a way that
the statutory classification is rationally related to it. When a statute names a class, that
class must share some common characteristic for that is the definitional attribute of a
"class". The nature of the burdens or benefits created by a statute and the nature of
the chosen class's commonality will always suggest a statutory purpose-to so burden
or benefit the common trait shared by members of the identified class. A statute's
classifications will be rationally related to such a purpose because the reach of the
purpose has been derived from the classifications themselves.
Id. See Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976), in which the Court accepted HEW's argument
that the design of the statute in question was "to provide for all children of deceased insureds
who can demonstrate their 'need' in terms of dependency at the times of the insureds' deaths."
Id. at 507. The Court held that the regulation requiring illegitimate children to show proof of
dependency, while not requiring such a showing by other children, was reasonably related to
this purpose. Id. at 510. Cf. Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974); Gomez v. Perez, 409
U.S. 535 (1973); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
253. See Barrett, supra note 159, at 122. See generally Note, Developments in the Law-
Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1065, 1077-79 (1969).
254. Barrett, supra note 159, at 122-29.
There are at least five possibilities. The Court could balance (1) the level of irrationali-
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observed that the standard of review used by the Court varies in degree
depending upon the particular classification at issue.
255
Under the two-tiered model of equal protection analysis, the Court has
traditionally exhibited great deference to legislative decisions in applying
the rational basis standard. 256 This is exemplified by Chief Justice Warren's
formulation of the standard in McGowan v. Maryland257 and McDonald v.
Board of Election Commissioners.258 In McGowan, he stated:
[T]he Fourteenth Amendment permits the States a wide scope of
discretion in enacting laws which affect some groups of citizens
differently than others. The constitutional safeguard is offended
only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the
achievement of the State's objective. State legislatures are pre-
sumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the
fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality. A
statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts
reasonably may be conceived to justify it.259
When applied as articulated, this standard normally results in the challenged
legislation being upheld. z ° In recent years, however, the inevitability of the
result under this test in areas other than economic regulation has been less
predictable.2 61 In a number of cases the Court, while ostensibly applying the
rational basis test, has reached results that exhibit a more detailed analysis
ty of the legislation-the extent to which the classification departs from perfect
correlation with the legislative purpose-against the state interest in maintaining the
normal political processes in our democratic society (which necessarily produce less-
than-perfect classifications); (2) the level of irrationality against the state interest in
economy and efficiency achieved by making the particular classifications; (3) the level
of irrationality against the nature and extent of the burden on the individual affected
by the classification (e.g., if the individual is imprisoned or denied welfare or educa-
tion, the classifications would have to be more rational than if his business were made
less profitable or his property less valuable); (4) the level of irrationality against the
invidiousness of the basis upon which the classification is drawn (e.g., a classification
based on lack of wealth would have to be more rational than one based on ability to
pass a driving test); and (5) the importance of the state interest being served by the
legislation against the nature and extent of the burden on the individual, or the relative
"invidiousness" of the classification.
Id. at 123.
255. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting).
256. See Foreword, supra note 129, at 8.
257. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
258. 394 U.S. 802 (1969).
259. 366 U.S. at 425-26. In McDonald, Warren expressed even greater deference: "Legis-
latures are presumed to have acted constitutionally even if source materials normally resorted
to for ascertaining their grounds for action are otherwise silent, and their statutory classifica-
tion will be set aside only if no grounds can be conceived to justify them." 394 U.S. at 809.
260. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 319 (1976) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
261. See Nowak, supra note 182, at 1073.
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and higher level of scrutiny than that articulated in the Warren formula-
tion.
262
In Trimble v. Gordon,263 for example, the Court employed the rational
basis standard but noted that the scrutiny under it "is not a toothless
one.'"264 The Court struck down an Illinois statute that totally barred illegiti-
mate children from inheriting from fathers who died intestate. In answer to
the state's argument that the scheme provided an accurate and efficient
method of property disposition at death, the Court noted that the statute was
inadequately attuned to alternative means of proving paternity.2 65 While
proof of paternity, as opposed to maternity, can present serious problems in
the case of an illegitimate child, the Court nevertheless held that such
problems did not justify the total disinheritance of illegitimate children
whose fathers die intestate. 266 The Court's approach in Trimble is certainly
not the deferential treatment envisioned by Chief Justice Warren's formula-
tion of the rational basis standard. While not meticulously tailored, the
Illinois scheme arguably provided a means of efficiently determining prop-
erty disposition at death.
Utilizing the rational basis standard in Stanton v. Stanton,267 the Court
invalidated the provisions of a Utah statute that required support payments
pursuant to a divorce decree for a male child until he reached the age of
twenty-one, but only to the age of eighteen for a female child. 268 The Court
stated that the statutory distinction, which was based on sex alone, was
"wholly unrelated to the objective of the statute.''269 The Court reached
similar results in other cases in which differences based on sex led to
disparate treatment in the context of Social Security benefits270 and the
administration of decedents' estates.
271
The Court similarly departed from a mood of judicial deference in
United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,272 invalidating a
section of the Food Stamp Act. 273 The Court held that the provisions of the
Act, which denied food stamps to any household containing an individual
unrelated to the other members of the household, were without any rational
262. See Wilkinson, supra note 182, at 951-54.
263. 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
264. Id. at 767 (quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976)).
265. Id. at 770-71.
266. Id.
267. 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
268. Id. at 9.
269. Id. at 14.
270. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
271. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
272. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
273. 7 U.S.C. § 2011 (1976).
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basis.2 74 The Court dismissed a "reasonable, if less than powerful," argu-
ment that unrelated households are more likely to contain abusers.275
The Court's most recent formulation of the rational basis standard is
found in Craig v. Boren. 276 At issue was an Oklahoma statute that pro-
hibited the sale of "non-intoxicating" 3.2% beer to males under the age of
twenty-one and to females under the age of eighteen. Writing for the
majority, Justice Brennan stated that to withstand constitutional challenge
such a distinction "must serve important governmental objectives and must
be substantially related to achievement of those objectives. "277
Despite the confusion in this area of equal protection, 278 a strong
argument for the invalidation of the Texas education statute can be
constructed. The avowed purpose of the statute is to relieve Texas taxpayers
of the fiscal burden of educating undocumented children. 279 The structure of
the Texas school financing scheme relies on contributions from local, state
and federal sources. 280 These funds are to be used by local school districts
for the education of local residents.281 The goal of equalizing contributions
may very well be a legitimate state interest. 282 Nevertheless the manner in
274. 413 U.S. at 538.
275. See Wilkinson, supra note 182, at 953 n.58 (citing The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87
HARV. L. REV. 1, 130 (1973)).
276. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
277. Id. at 197.
278. In addition to the cases cited in the text, other Supreme Court decisions have em-
ployed different formulations of the rational basis standard. See, e.g., Fuller v. Oregon, 417
U.S. 40 (1974); San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973)
(challenged statutory distinction must further some "legitimate, articulated state purpose");
James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 140 (1972); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 173-
76 (1972); Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 308-09 (1966).
279. See note 12 and accompanying text supra. The history and the construction of the
amended statute reveals that its overriding purpose is to discriminate against undocumented
children, depriving them of equal access to education. See note 6 supra. Although states have
wide latitude in drawing their statutes, they are constitutionally constrained when the purpose is
to harm a politically unpopular group. USDA v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528,534 (1973). Consequent-
ly, Texas' purposeful discrimination against undocumented children cannot stand as the ex-
press governmental goal against which to test the classification.
280. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1. 6 (1973); Wright v.
Houston Independent School Dist., 393 F. Supp. 1149, 1154 (S.D. Tex. 1975). See also notes
166-70 and accompanying text supra.
281. Love v. City of Dallas, 120 Tex. 351, 40 S.W.2d 20 (1931), invol~ed a suit brought by
Texas high school students, all of whom lived outside the city of Dallas and some of whom lived
outside the county of Dallas, who sought admission to Dallas city high schools. The Texas
Supreme Court held that since the state constitution "contemplates that [school] districts shall
be organized and taxes levied for the education of scholastics within the districts, it is obvious
that the education of nonresident scholastics is not within their ordinary functions as quasi-
municipal corporations . . . . [The Legislature . . . cannot compel [a] district to construct
buildings and levy taxes for the education of nonresident pupils." Id. at 367, 40 S.W.2d at 27.
282. See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 448 (1973).
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which Texas seeks to achieve its aim is insufficiently related to its purpose,
particularly in light of the degree of individial deprivation. Moreover, a
classification that singles out the undocumented child to pay tuition is both
underinclusive and overinclusive 2 83 It does not require tuition of children
whose parents reside in the community but pay no taxes. At the same time,
it includes all undocumented children, large numbers of whose parents do
contribute to available education funds through property taxes, income taxes
and other means.284 Because the Texas classification is not rationally related
to the accomplishment of its purpose, it should be invalidated.
D. Balancing: An Alternative
The situation of undocumented children exemplifies the difficulty in-
herent in attempting to fit all legislative classifications neatly into "the
conventional mosaic of constitutional analysis under the Equal Protection
Clause." 285 Some classifications defy easy characterization in terms of one
test or the other. 286 As Justice Marshall has recently pointed out:
It cannot be gainsaid that there remain rights, not now classified as
"fundamental," that remain vital to the flourishing of a free soci-
ety, and classes, not now classified as "suspect," that are unfairly
burdened by invidious discrimination unrelated to the individual
worth of their members.2v
The Texas statute offers the Supreme Court an opportunity to abandon its
stated commitment to the two-tiered model and to embrace a more flexible
balancing approach for equal protection analysis. As Justice Marshall has
correctly pointed out: "[a]ll interests not 'fundamental' and all classes not
'suspect' are not the same; and it is time for the Court to drop the pretense
that, for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause, they are.'"288 A number of
alternative models have been proposed.28 9 Reflecting the authors' percep-
tion of the Court's current analysis, most alternative formulations suggest a
balancing of relevant factors to determine the validity of legislative classifi-
cations.
290
283. See Barrett, supra note 159, at 122.
284. See text accompanying notes 171-76 supra.
285. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 18 (1973).
286. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
287. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 320 (1976) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
288. Id. at 321.
289. See generally Foreword, supra note 129; Wilkinson, supra note 182; Nowak, supra
note 182; Barrett, supra note 159.
290. See Foreword, supra note 129, at 20-24; Wilkinson, supra note 182, at 990-98.
Professor Wilkinson limits his balancing approach to rights involving equality of opportunity.
He asserts it is inappropriate to use such balancing in areas of political equality, where the
Court should actively safeguard individual political rights, and economic equality, where the
Court should defer to legislative action. Id. at 990-1017.
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Justice Marshall has been the most persistent member of the Court to
urge recognition of an alternate approach. As long ago as 1970,291 he
proposed a balancing approach based on three factors: "1) the character of
the classification in question, 2) the relative importance to individuals in the
class discriminated against of the governmental benefits that they do not
receive and 3) the asserted state interests in support of the classification."292
The chief advantage of Marshall's approach is its flexibility: it can accom-
modate differences in strength and importance of governmental and indi-
vidual interests in various factual settings. 293 The Texas statute is well-
suited to such a flexible balancing analysis.
1. Education as an Important Governmental Benefit
The importance of education to our political and social fabric cannot be
doubted. The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the central role that
education plays in fostering an individual's personal development, as well
as its contribution to society as a whole.294 Even in San Antonio Indepen-
dent School District v. Rodriguez,295 in which the Court held that education
is not a fundamental right for purposes of equal protection analysis, the
majority opinion reaffirmed the importance of education and the vital role it
plays in any free society. 29
6
291. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
292. Id. at 521. A recent application of Justice Marshall's model involving age discrimina-
tion can be found in his dissent in Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307,
317-27 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
293. Wilkinson, supra note 182, at 989.
294. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (Burger, C.J.) ("Providing public schools
ranks at the very apex of the function of a State." Id. at 213); Abington School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("Americans regard the public schools
as a most vital civic institution for the preservation of a democratic system of government." Id.
at 230.); Brown v. Board of Educ. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Warren, C.J.) (As Chief Justice Warren
stated, "[t]oday, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local govern-
ments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both
demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is
required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed
forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in
awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in
helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child
may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.
Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be
made available to all on equal terms." Id. at 493.); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)
(McReynolds, J.) ("The American people have always regarded education and acquisition of
knowledge as matters of supreme importance ....... Id. at 400); Interstate Ry. Co. v.
Massachusetts, 207 U.S. 79 (1907) (Holmes, J.) ("Education is one of the purposes for which
what is called the police power may be exercised. . . .Massachusetts al ays has recognized it
as one of the first objects of public care." Id. at 87 (citation omitted)).
295. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
296. Id. at 30.
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The importance of education is underscored by its historical link in this
country to the concept of equality of opportunity.2 97 During the last decade
of the Warren Court, equality emerged as a major focal point of constitu-
tional dimensions. 298 Recent decisions by the Supreme Court demonstrate
great judicial concern for and commitment to the goal of equal opportuni-
ty.299 Because of its link with personal opportunity, education is the key to
attainment of this goal. Moreover, the importance of education in enabling
or preparing individuals to exercise recognized liberties, such as liberty of
thought, redress of grievances, and physical, social and economic mobility
cannot be underestimated. 300 These liberties are mere formalisms without
the ability to realize and make use of their underlying value. 30 1 Even if the
liberties of undocumented aliens are not coextensive with those of other
individuals in this country, undocumented aliens should not be denied the
opportunity to prepare for the effective exercise of the liberties they do
enjoy. To deny undocumented children as a class the opportunity of public
education is to deprive them of their only opportunity to break the cycle of
poverty and ignorance in which they live.
3°2
2. The Character of the Classification
The Texas statute denying free public education to undocumented
children singles out children in the United States who are not citizens or
lawful resident aliens and subjects them to unequal treatment. They are
discriminated against as a class on the basis of a status determined by federal
law, for reasons unrelated to the purpose of the education statute. The
classification is the reflection of historic prejudices, which are aimed at a
politically unpopular group, rather than a reflection of legislative rationali-
ty.303 Moreover, the reality of the situation compels acknowledgment of the
racial overtones of the classification.
304
297. See Wilkinson, supra note 182, at 977. See also Richards, Equal Opportunity and
School Financing: Towards a Moral Theory of Constitutional Adjudication, 41 U. CHI. L. REV.
32, 52-53 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Richards].
298. Wilkinson, supra note 182, at 949, 984.
299. Id. at 987.
300. See Richards, supra note 297, at 46.
301. Id. at 46-47 n.68.
302. See note 58 and accompanying text supra. See also Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762
(1977); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974);
New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968);
Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
303. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 105 (1973) (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
304. See text accompanying notes 16-17 supra.
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Such statutes are impermissibly underinclusive and overinclusive. 305
The colorable purpose of the Texas statute is to guarantee that the limited
funds available for education are spent on citizens or legal resident aliens,
on the theory that they are entitled to benefits because they, through their
parents, contribute to the funding sources through the payment of various
taxes. 3 ' In this regard, however, there is no logical basis for distinguishing
undocumented children from out-of-state children who have recently en-
tered the school system. 307 To the contrary, recently arrived citizen or
resident alien children are arguably less entitled to education benefits than
undocumented children who have resided in a state for a period of time. The
parents of recently arrived children would not have contributed to local
sources of education funding at all, whereas the parents of the undocument-
ed child may well have contributed through the payment of rent, state and
local sales taxes, and other taxes.
308
3. Preserving the Fiscal Integrity of Public Education
The asserted interest of the state of Texas in denying undocumented
children equal access to free public education is to preserve the fiscal
integrity of its school system. 3°9 Maintaining the fiscal integrity of public
schools is an important and legitimate state interest, on a par with a state's
interest in local control of its schools. 310 Local control serves to promote
local responsibility; fiscal integrity ensures that schools will continue to
operate.
A state's interest in preserving limited resources is not, however, a
compelling state interest that justifies invidious discrimination. 311 Moreov-
305. See text accompanying notes 10-22 and 279-284 supra.
306. See text accompanying notes 171-75 supra.
307. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976), for an analogous situation in which a
distinction was made between citizens and lawfully admitted aliens in the payment of welfare
benefits. The Court stated:
Insofar as state welfare policy is concerned, there is little, if any, basis for treating
persons who are citizens of another State differently from persons who are citizens of
another country. Both groups are noncitizens as far as the State's interests in adminis-
tering its welfare programs are concerned. Thus, a division by a State of the category
of persons who are not citizens of that State into sub-categories of United States
citizens and aliens has no apparent justification ....
Id. at 85.
308. See Doe v. Plyler, No. TY-77-261-CA, (E.D. Tex., Sept. 12, 1977) (order granting
preliminary injunction), Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 12.
309. Id. at 11. See text accompanying notes 10-18 supra.
310. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 126 (1973)
(Marshall, J., dissenting). See also Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 469 (1972).
311. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969): "We recognize that a State has a valid
interest in preserving the fiscal integrity of its programs. . . . But a State may not accomplish
such a purpose by invidious distinction between classes of its citizens. It could not, for example,
reduce expenditures for education by barring indigent children from its schools." Id. at 633
(emphasis added). See also Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 12 (1977).
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er, the state cannot have a "special interest" in tax revenue to which
undocumented persons have contributed along with citizens or legal resi-
dents.312 Further, the state interest to be served by the statute must be
weighed against countervailing considerations. The use of an essentially
racial classification, the importance of education to the persons affected,
and the marginal state interest arguably served, would, on balance, appear
to favor equal access to free public education for undocumented children.
As a consequence, under Justice Marshall's alternate approach, 313 the Texas
statute denying such children equal access to that state's public schools
should be invalidated as violative of the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
V. Federal Preemption Challenge
The supremacy of federal power to regulate immigration is unques-
tioned. 314 Until recently, Congress' power "to establish an uniform rule of
naturalization" 315 and the Immigration and Nationality Act3 16 were thought
to preempt state legislation affecting immigration.317 In De Canas v. Bi-
ca,318 however, the Supreme Court held that a state enactment dealing with
aliens might not constitute a "regulation" of immigration such that it was
necessarily preempted by federal legislation. 319 Under De Canas, the test
for determining federal preemption is two-pronged. Federal regulation is
deemed preemptive of state regulatory power if either "the Congress has
unmistakably so ordained" or if "the nature of the regulated subject matter
permits no other conclusion."
320
312. See Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 12 (1977); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365,
376 (1971).
313. See text accompanying notes 291-93 supra.
314. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62
(1941); Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849).
315. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
316. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
317. See The Undocumented Worker, supra note 19, at 165-66. On the subject of preemp-
tion generally and the Burger Court's unwillingness to preempt state action, see Note, The
Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L.
REV. 623 (1975).
318. 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
319. Id. at 354. For a critique of the Court's treatment of this issue, see Comment, The
Undocumented Alien Laborer and De Canas v. Bica: The Supreme Court Capitulates to Public
Pressure, 3 CHICANO L. REV. 148, 150-55 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Undocuniented Alien and
De Canas].
320. Id. at 356. This test was derived from Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul,
373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963) which dealt with federal preemption in the context of a state's
regulation of commerce.
Winter 1978]
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
A. Congressional Intent to Preempt
Any discussion of congressional intent to preempt state regulation
dealing with immigration must begin with De Canas. In that case, the Court
held that Congress did not intend to preempt states from regulating the
employment of illegal aliens.321 In so holding, the Court considered the
following four factors. First, states have broad authority to regulate the
ehiployment relationship to protect their citizens.22 Second, the wording
and legislative history of the Immigration and Nationality Act do not
indicate that Congress intended to preclude harmonious state regulation
dealing with the employment of illegal aliens. 323 Third, employment of
illegal aliens is at best a "peripheral concern" of the Immigration and
Nationality Act.324 And, finally, the Federal Farm Labor Contractor Regis-
tration Act,32 dealing expressly with the employment of illegal aliens,
specifically allowed supplemental state regulations.326
When these four factors are analyzed in the context of the denial of
equal access to education to undocumented children, however, a different
result is reached. Although the regulation of education, like the regulation of
employment, is primarily a matter of local or state concern, 327 "even state
regulation designed to protect vital state interests must give way to
paramount federal legislation." 32 In De Canas, the Court acknowledged
that the words and legislative history of the Immigration and Nationality Act
leave room for some state regulation affecting aliens. 329 The issue remains
whether a state statute denying undocumented children equal access to
education is the type of regulation contemplated by the Act.
The central concern of the Immigration and Nationality Act is with the
terms and conditions of admission to the country. 330 It is presumed, there-
fore, that Congress intended to preempt state action in this area. 33 1 States
can neither "add to nor take from the conditions lawfully imposed by
Congress upon admission, naturalization and residence of aliens in the
United States or the several states." 332 The conditions upon which an alien
321. 424 U.S. at 356, 362.
322. Id. at 356.
323. Id. at 358-59.
324. Id. at 360.
325. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2041-2055 (1976).
326. 424 U.S. at 361-62.
327. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42 (1973).
328. 424 U.S. at 357.
329. Id. at 358.
330. Id. at 359.
331. Id.




may be excluded 333 or deported334 have been set out by Congress and
interpreted by the courts and administrative agencies.3 35 Moreover,
Congress has established provisions that may allow an otherwise deportable
alien to remain lawfully in the country. 336 As a consequence, until an order
of deportation is obtained by the Attorney General, 337 the federal govern-
ment cannot force an alien to leave the country.
338
A statute such as the Texas statute requires a state or local agency to
inquire into and determine each child's immigration status.3 39 Such a deter-
mination is the central and exclusive concern of the federal government. 34°
The California Labor Code provision341 examined in De Canas does not
pose this problem because it operates "only with respect to individuals
whom the Federal Government has already declared cannot work in this
country." 342 The employer is not called upon to inquire into the prospective
333. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1181-1226 (1970).
334. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227, 1251-1260 (1970).
335. Procedure for judicial review of deportation orders after administrative remedies are
exhausted is found in 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (1970).
336. The discretionary relief available includes suspension of deportation, stay of deporta-
tion, adjustment of status, waiver of deportation and private bills. See Alternatives to Deporta-
tion, supra note 114, at 333-39.
337. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4) (1970). Although deportation is a civil proceeding, the govern-
ment's burden of proof is higher than in ordinary civil cases. See United States v. Ortiz, 422
U.S. 891, 906 (1975) (appendix to concurring opinion of Burger, C.J.).
338. 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (1970). Furthermore, an alien who is present in this country illegally
but who broke no law to gain entrance is not guilty of any crime and is subject only to the
sanction of deportation under federal law. Abrams & Abrams, Immigration Policy-Who Gets
In and Why?, THE PUBLIC INTEREST, Winter 1975, at 23. See 2 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFELD,
IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE 9-1 to 9-92 (1977) (listing civil and criminal penalties but
omitting any mention of illegal alien status as a crime in itself).
339. The Texas statute allows only "legally admitted aliens" to attend free public schools,
but the term "legally admitted aliens" is not defined in the statute. TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. tit.
2, § 21.031 (Vernon Supp. 1978). As a result individual school districts promulgated policies
concerning the financing and control of the education of illegally admitted aliens. For example,
the policy of the Board of Education for the Tyler Independent School District states:
The Tyler Independent School District shall enroll all qualified students who are
citizens of the United States or legally admitted aliens, and who are residents of this
school district, free of tuition charge. Illegal aliens [sic] children may enroll and attend
schools in the Tyler Independent School District by payment of the full tuition fee.
A legally admitted alien is one who has documentation that he or she is legally in the United
States, or a person who is in the process of securing documentation from the United States
Immigration Service, and the Service will state that the person is being processed and will be
admitted with proper documentation. Doe v. Plyler, No. TY-77-261-CA (E.D. Tex., Sept. 12,
1977), Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 2. Compare this language with CAL. WELF.
& INST. CODE § 11104 (West 1972), which deprives aliens under federal order of deportation of
state welfare benefits.
340. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 359 (1976).
341. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2805(a) (West Supp. 1977).
342. 424 U.S. at 363. See Comment, State Regulation of the Employment of Illegal Aliens:
A Constitutional Approach, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 565, 565-66 (1973).
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employee's immigration status or to make any determination as to that
status. Moreover, the only determination that the state is required to make is
whether the employer knowingly hired an undocumented person. Such a
determination can be made solely by reference to state law.
343
Furthermore, unlike De Canas,3 " there is no federal statute that
contemplates state regulation of the education of undocumented children.
The primary federal statute dealing with financial assistence to local educa-
tion is Title 1 of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965.
345
This Act provides -for the distribution of federal funds to local schools to aid
low income children. 34 The purpose of the Act is "to give young people a
chance to break the cycle of poverty and poor education that so many of
them and their parents have known." 347 Under the Act, children are defined
as "all children aged five through seventeen, inclusive. -348 No distinction
is made among children of citizens, resident aliens or undocumented aliens.
Therefore, by implication, local schools teaching undocumented, low in-
come children should be the recipients of these federal funds. Because the
Texas statute thwarts the objective of the Act by operating to deny undocu-
mented, low income children access to local public schools, it is inconsis-
tent with congressional intent to regulate this area.
B. Preemption by Burdening Federal Objectives
Although the above analysis is sufficient to void the Texas statute, the
statute suffers even more seriously under the second prong of the preemp-
tion test, which requires invalidation if the state statute stands as an obstacle
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress in enacting the Immigration and Nationality Act.34 9 This requires a
determination of whether the state statute can be enforced "without impair-
ing the Federal superintendence of the field."350 The Supreme Court in De
Canas could not reach this issue on the record before it, and ordered the
case remanded to the California court.351 The Court indicated that the state
343. Under California law "knowingly" is defined in CAL. PENAL CODE § 7 (West 1970).
See also People v. Flumerfelt, 35 Cal. App. 2d 495, 96 P.2d 190 (1939).
344. In De Canas, the Federal Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act was interpreted to
recognize congressional intent to allow states to regulate undocumented workers. 424 U.S. at
361-62.
345. 20 U.S.C. § 241a-244a (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
346. Id. at § 241a (1970).
347. H.R. REP. No. 805, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4093, 4096.
348. 20 U.S.C. § 241(c)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1975).




court should attempt, if possible, to reconcile the state statute with the
federal scheme. 352 To determine whether the Texas statute impairs federal
goals, two areas must be examined: first, the Texas statute's impairment of
the objectives of the Immigration and Nationality Act; and second, the
statute's effect on the federal government's exclusive power over interna-
tional relations.
When a state is allowed to determine a person's immigration status, a
potential conflict with the federal standards and policies under the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act emerges. Federal officials are charged with the
responsibility of enforcing our immigration laws. 353 Moreover, federal stan-
dards govern who is or can become a lawful resident. 3 4 To allow a state
determination of immigration status to impose disabilities on undocumented
children conflicts with federal power.
355
352. As the Court noted in De Canas:
Of course, even absent such a manifestation of congressional intent to "occupy
the field," the Supremacy Clause requires the invalidation of any state legislation that
burdens or conflicts in any manner with any federal laws or treaties. . . . However,
"conflicting law, absent repealing or exclusivity provisions, should be pre-empted
S. 'only to the extent necessary to protect the achievement of' " the aims of the
federal law, since "the proper approach is to reconcile the operation of both statutory
schemes with one another rather than holding [the state scheme] completely ousted."
Id. at 357-58 n.5 (citation omitted). Professor T. Krattinmacher at the Conference on Immigra-
tion Law held at Georgetown University Law Center on March 26, 1976, stated:
De Canas is a sterile case in that the California court held § 2805 unconstitutional in
the abstract and the Supreme Court reversed that decision as such. . . . Whether the
statute can ever be constitutional as applied to any given fact situation is a totally
different question. My hunch is that the state court will find § 2805 unconstitutional as
well . ..
Undocumented Alien and De Canas, supra note 319, at 163 n.66.
353. The Attorney General is charged with the administration and enforcement of the
Immigration and Naturalization of Aliens. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1970). In exercising this responsi-
bility, Attorney General Bell has indicated that he intends to eliminate massive deportations of
undocumented persons because it would be inhumane and impractical. S.F. Chronicle, Feb. 14,
1977, at 5, col. 6.
354. See text accompanying notes 332-38 supra. Recently, in Silva v. Levi, Civ. No. 76C-
4268 (N.D. Ill., Mar. 10, 1977), Judge Grady ordered the federal government to stop deportation
procedures against 280,000 Mexican and Latino illegal aliens who were denied visas because of
United States immigration quotas. L. A. Daily Journal, Mar. 14, 1977, at 1, col. 3; S.F.
Chronicle, June 13, 1977, at 9, col. I.
355. See Williams v. Williams, 328 F. Supp. 1381 (D.V.I. 1971) in which the court stated:
To deny an alien access to our divorce courts on the sole ground that he may be in
violation of an immigration law would be to deny both due process and the equal
protection of the laws. Such a denial would attach a civil disability to some aliens
without the prior benefit of the procedures designed for the purpose of enforcing the
immigration laws. . . . The remedy for a violation [of the immigration laws] is
deportation or other administrative sanction, not withdrawal of the right of access to
our divorce courts.
Id. at 1383 (citation omitted).
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Regulation of immigration is also integrally related to international
relations, 356 which is an area of exclusive federal concern.3 57 In Hines v.
Davidowitz,35 s the Supreme Court held that Pennsylvania's Alien Registra-
tion Act359 was preempted by the Federal Alien Registration Act. The Court
noted that state enforcement of any laws regarding aliens was a particularly
dangerous endeavor because "subjecting [aliens]. . . to indiscriminate and
repeated interception and interrogation by public officials . . . bears an
inseparable relationship to the welfare and tranquility of all the states
"1360
Further, the federal government, in exercising its power over interna-
tional relations, entered into the Protocol of Buenos Aires with other
members of the Organization of American States. 361 This agreement, an
amendment to the O.A.S. Charter362 which deals in part with education in
the Western Hemisphere, was designed to promote "the economic, social
and cultural development of the peoples of the Hemisphere" by "reaffirm-
ing the determination of the American States to combine their efforts in a
spirit of solidarity in the permanent task of achieving the general conditions
of well-being that will ensure a life of dignity and freedom to their peo-
ples. "363 Under this protocol, it was agreed that each signatory nation would
endeavor to provide compulsory free public education to all children.3 64 The
Texas statute is contrary to the spirit of this international agreement. 365
International controversies of great magnitude may arise from real or imagi-
356. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 64 (1941).
357. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440-41 (1968).
358. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
359. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 1801-1806 (Purdon 1977). Although the holding in Hines has
been construed by lower courts as a recognition of total federal preemption in the field of
immigration, see, e.g., Dolores Canning Co. v. Howard, 40 Cal. App. 3d 673, 115 Cal. Rptr. 435
(1974), the Court's decision in De Canas gives Hines a narrow construction. De Canas v. Bica,
424 U.S. 351, 362-63 (1976).
360. 312 U.S. at 65-66.
361. Protocol of Amendment to the Charter of the Organization of American States,
"Protocol of Buenos Aires", Feb. 27, 1967, [1970] 21 U.S.T. 607, T.I.A.S. No. 6847.
362. Charter of the Organization of American States, April 30, 1948, [1952] 2 U.S.T. 2395,
T.I.A.S. No. 2361.
363. Id., as amended by [1970] 21 U.S.T. 670, T.I.A.S. No. 6847.
364. Article 47 of the O.A.S. Charter, as amended by the Protocol, reads:
The member States will exert the greatest efforts, in accordance with their
constitutional processes, to ensure the effective exercise of the right to education, on
the following bases:
a) Elementary education, compulsory for children of school age, shall also be
offered to all others who can benefit from it. When provided by the State it shall be
without charge. ...
Id., as amended by [1970] 21 U.S.T. 670, 672, T.I.A.S. No. 6847.
365. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 231 (1942); Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S.
483, 488 (1880).
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Fueled by the hysteria regarding illegal aliens in the United States,
states are now seeking to limit the entry of undocumented aliens by denying
them state benefits. 368 In the past, the Supreme Court has invalidated
attempts by individual states to protect their own resources in the face of a
366. Mexico and members of minority groups in the United States, particularly Mexican-
Americans, have become increasingly concerned about abuses generated by federal enforce-
ment of the immigration laws. In fact, Mexican officials have officially protested to the United
States regarding the treatment of Mexican nationals by American officials. See Illegal Aliens
and Enforcement, supra note 138, at 148. Similarly, minority groups have complained. Id. at
132. Discriminatory enforcement of the immigration laws, especially with respect to persons of
Mexican descent, has in fact been wide-spread. In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S.
873, 886-87 (1975), the Court specifically condemned the INS' practice of detaining people of
Mexican ancestry to discover undocumented aliens. See also Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod,
540 F.2d 1062 (7th Cir. 1976), which affirmed the granting of a prohibitory injunction against the
INS' questioning of persons solely on the basis of racial characteristics. Local enforcement
efforts will only exacerbate these difficulties. See Illegal Aliens and Enforcement, supra note
138, at 148.
367. In addition to being violative of this treaty, the Texas statute could have an adverse
effect upon the United States' international relations with Mexico. In Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52 (1941), the Court not only warned of what might happen to the interstate relations of the
United States if each state were allowed to impose "repeated interceptions and interrogations
by public officials" on aliens, id. at 66, but it also warned of the international repercussions that
would arise from such actions. The Court stated: "Laws imposing such burdens are not mere
census requirements, and even though they may be immediately associated with the accom-
plishment of a local purpose, they provoke questions in the field of international affairs." Id.
Earlier in its decision, the Court also warned that:
One of the most important and delicate of all international relationships, recog-
nized immemorially as a responsibility of government, has to do with the protection of
the just rights of a country's own nationals when those nationals are in another
country. Experience has shown that international controversies of the gravest mo-
ment, sometimes even leading to war, may arise from real or imagined wrongs to
another's subjects inflicted, or permitted, by a government. This country, like other
nations, has entered into numerous treaties of amity and commerce since its incep-
tion-treaties entered into under express constitutional authority, and by binding upon
the states as well as the nation.
Id. at 64-65 (footnote omitted).
Recently, the United States and Mexico have held negotiations aimed at solving the
complex problems presented by the migration of undocumented aliens. State statutes affecting
undocumented aliens may interfere with the federal government's ability to act in these
negotiations. These negotiations are chronicled in the papers of former Presidents Nixon and
Ford. See 1972 PuB. PAPERS 695; 1974 PUB. PAPERS 419.
368. See comments of Professor Charles Gordon, former Chief Counsel for the INS, in
Undocumented Alien and De Canas, supra note 319, at 155 n.35.
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national problem. 369 The attempt by Texas to protect its school funds by
barring undocumented children from free public education presents an
analogous situation.
Specific federal legislation prohibiting states from denying undocu-
mented children equal access to public education could resolve this prob-
lem 370 Increased federal responsibility for education could also eliminate the
financial problems that have motivated Texas to act as it has. 37 1 Neverthe-
less, because Congress has not acted, undocumented children must rely on
the courts for protection against discriminatory state regulation. While
various constitutional arguments may be employed to strike down such
legislation, it is difficult to predict how a court will treat these delicate
issues. The equal protection and substantive due process analyses require
judicial extension of these constitutional doctrines. In contrast, the preemp-
tion argument avoids the necessity of enlarging the rights of aliens as a
class. The doctrine of preemption exists, however, not to protect the interest
of the individual, but rather to protect the federal government's interest in a
uniform national immigration policy.
State legislative action, such as the Texas statute, can only compound
the problem of illegal immigration. Largely the result of international
economic conditions, illegal immigration can only be solved by broadly
based federal action and international cooperation.
372
369. See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941), in which the Court held invalid a
California law developed to preserve state resources during the Depression by making it a crime
to bring into the state any indigent person who was not a resident of the state.
370. Under the supremacy clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, c. 2, "any state law, however
clearly within a State's acknowledged power, which . . . is contrary to federal law, must
yield." Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962).
371. See Comment, Health Care for Indigent Illegal Aliens: Whose Responsibility?, 8
U.C.D. L. REV. 107, 123 (1976) in which an analogous proposal relating to federal financial
responsibility for health care for undocumented persons is discussed.
372. See Illegal Aliens and Enforcement, supra note 138, at 161.
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